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ABSTRACT
FINANCIAL VALUATION OF FLEXIBLE SUPPLY
CHAIN CONTRACTS
Ali Go¨kay Ero¨n
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa C¸. Pınar
November, 2008
We consider a single buyer - single supplier multiple period quantity flexibility
contract in which the buyer has options to buy in case of a higher than expected
demand in addition to the committed purchases at the beginning of each period of
the contract. We take the buyer’s point of view and find the maximum value of the
contract for the buyer by analyzing the financial and real markets simultaneously.
We assume both markets evolve as discrete scenario trees. Furthermore, under
the assumption that the demand of the item correlates perfectly with the price
of the risky security we present a model to find the buyer’s maximum acceptable
price of the contract. Applying duality, we develop sufficient conditions on some
parameters to decrease the value of the contract. Then, an experimental study
is presented to illustrate the impacts of all the parameters on the value of the
contract and the option. We show that the model can also be extended to the
case of partially correlated demand and the risky asset price under the assumption
that the markets evolve as binomial trees. Finally, we apply duality and perform
numerical analysis for the latter assumption.
Keywords: Flexible supply chain contract, options, arbitrage, martingales, dual-
ity, binomial trees.
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O¨ZET
ESNEK TEDARI˙K ZI˙NCI˙RI˙ SO¨ZLES¸MELERI˙NI˙N
FI˙NANSAL DEG˘ERLERI˙
Ali Go¨kay Ero¨n
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Dr. Mustafa C¸. Pınar
Kasım, 2008
Perakendecinin her periyot bas¸ında alınacak olan o¨nceden belirlenmis¸ siparis¸lere
ek olarak, beklenenden fazla talep olması durumunda kullanılmak u¨zere op-
siyonlara sahip oldug˘u, c¸ok periyotlu, tek perakendeci - tek tedarikc¸i es-
nek miktarlı so¨zles¸meler ele alınmaktadır. Problem, perakendecinin bakıs¸
ac¸ısından deg˘erlendirilip, so¨zles¸me ic¸in o¨denmesi kabul edilmesi gereken mak-
simum deger, finansal ve reel marketler, her iki marketin de kesikli senaryo
ag˘acı olarak hareket ettig˘i varsayımı altında ilis¸kilendirilerek analiz edilmek-
tedir. Bunun yanında, talebin riskli menkul kıymet ile tam korelasyon
go¨sterdig˘i varsayımı altında, perakendecinin so¨zles¸me ic¸in kabul edeceg˘i maksi-
mum fiyat ic¸in bir model gelis¸tirilmektedir. Dualite uygulanarak, so¨zles¸menin
fiyatını du¨s¸u¨rebilmek amacıyla bazı model parametreleri ic¸in yeterli kos¸ullar
gelis¸tirilmektedir. Modeldeki parametrelerin, so¨zles¸me ve opsiyon deg˘erleri
u¨zerindeki etkilerini go¨rebilmek ac¸ısından deneysel bir c¸alıs¸ma uygulanmaktadır.
Modelin, marketlerin ikili kesikli senaryo ag˘acı olarak hareket ettig˘i ve talebin
riskli menkul kıymet ile kısmen korelasyon go¨sterdig˘i varsayımı altındaki du-
rumda da uygulanabilir oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir. Son olarak, bu varsayım ic¸in
de dualite uygulanıp numerik c¸alıs¸malar yapılmaktadır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Esnek tedarik zinciri so¨zles¸meleri, opsiyonlar, martingale,
dualite, ikili kesikli senaryo ag˘ac¸ları.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, economic globalization lead to an increased importance of a firms’
ability to adapt to the changing market needs quickly to compete effectively in
the market. For example, in the case of a single buyer - single supplier system
where the demand is highly unpredictable, flexibility for the buyer to be able to
get additional products in response to demand changes is essential. While this
flexibility is in benefit for the buyer, it incurs extra costs for the supplier.
These costs are due to some inflexibilities that the supplier faces; additional
inventories of the finished goods or raw materials, long production or procurement
lead times and accelerating or out-sourcing production. This leads the supplier
to provide a flexibility less than what is requested by the buyer.
Consider a single buyer - single supplier system where the buyer receives the
finished products from the supplier, stores and sells them to customers in the end
market at a fixed market price that is exogenously specified. The buyer and the
supplier agree on a multiple quantity flexibility contract in which the buyer has
options for the case of higher than expected demand in addition to the committed
purchases at the beginning of each period. The buyer is faced with two decisions
before the horizon. First of these decisions is to place orders for goods to be
delivered at the beginning of each period. The other is to purchase options from
the supplier which enable the buyer to order additional units of goods before the
1
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beginning of the next period after observing the actual demand of the current
period.
The total procurement costs for the buyer associated with this contract consist
of the cost of the committed quantity of goods, the cost of the options purchased
and the cost of using the option.
When we consider the supplier’s point of view, there may be raw materi-
als/components that he procures from his upstream suppliers with long lead
times. Therefore, the supplier may have to order raw materials at the begin-
ning, covering both the committed quantity of goods and the number of options
purchased as there is no opportunity of reordering during the periods due to the
long lead times. This brings the supplier some uncertainty with regard to the
number of orders of additional units that the buyer may place. Furthermore,
he has to carry the additional units of raw materials which is costly. Therefore,
to provide flexibility to the buyer, the supplier makes a commitment to produce
additional goods up to a number and offers options at a price to share the asso-
ciated risks. That is, to get the flexibility to purchase additional units besides
the committed quantity of goods, there is a certain price that the buyer has to
pay for the contract to the supplier. Intuitively, the supplier wishes to gain as
much as he can from the contract. However, the buyer will be willing to buy the
contract up to a certain price.
In this thesis, we assume that financial and real markets evolve as discrete
scenario trees. We further assume that there is a perfect correlation between
the demand and the price of some risky asset traded in a financial market which
implies that the scenario trees of the markets coincide. We then find the maximum
price that the buyer should accept to pay for the contract by studying the financial
and real markets simultaneously. We analyze the problem of the buyer who has
zero initial portfolio, and hence, makes short sales of risky assets to buy the
contract and then repay his debts by self-financing transactions in the financial
market and the cash flows generated in the real market by operations. Therefore,
at each node the portfolio value of the buyer is composed of the portfolio value
of parent node and the cash flow generated in the real market at that node. We
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then relax the assumption of perfect correlation of demand of the item with the
price of some risk asset and analyze the value of the contract to the buyer in
presence of the partially correlated demand and the risky asset.
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
In Chapter 2, we provide a review of the literature that is closely related to
the problem under consideration.
In Chapter 3, we review the stochastic process governing the security prices.
Furthermore, we introduce financial markets and the basic concepts (arbitrage
and martingales) of our analysis. Finally, we review the pricing problems of
writers and buyers of contingent claims.
In Chapter 4, the real market is described and the relation between the fi-
nancial and real markets are analyzed. Also, the assumptions and notations are
listed. Then, the model is developed under the assumption that the demand of
the item correlates perfectly with the price of the risky asset.
In Chapter 5, the problem discussed in Chapter 4 is analyzed through the
duality. Then, by analyzing the dual, the effects of some parameters on the value
of the contract are stated through observations.
In Chapter 6, we present an experimental study to illustrate the effects of the
parameters on the values of the contract and the cost of the flexibility available to
the buyer. This study will enable us to derive managerial insights and interpret
the data numerically.
In Chapter 7, the model developed in Chapter 4 is extended to the case of
partially correlated demand and the risky asset price under the assumption that
both markets evolve as binomial trees. Then, by analyzing the extended model
through the dual, the validity of observations made in Chapter 5 is discussed. The
chapter ends with the analysis of the effects of the parameters on the values of the
contract and the cost of the flexibility available to the buyer by an experimental
study.
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In Chapter 8, we conclude the thesis by giving an overall summary and listing
some possible future research directions.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
In this chapter, we review the literature that is related to the problem under
consideration. We begin with the paper of King [1] who models the hedging of
contingent claims in the discrete time, discrete state case as a stochastic program.
In his paper, claims are treated as a liability of the writer and a mathematical
structure based on duality is developed to analyze them. The conditions under
which the buyer buys the claim offered by the writer are discussed and it is
observed that differences in liability/endowment structures must be introduced to
buy/sell options. The model is extended to incorporate differences in risk aversion
and transaction costs. It is shown that arbitrage pricing in incomplete markets
does not lead to trade of options. The author also considers another extension
of the model in which pre-existing liabilities or endowments are introduced. He
observes that pre-existing liability structure or endowments of the market players
are the reasons to trade in options.
Delft and Vial [3] propose a practical approach to construct stochastic pro-
gramming models to solve sequential decision-making problems under uncer-
tainty. In their paper, it is shown that complex problems can be formulated
even by non-professional users by means of algebraic modeling languages and
solved by commercial solvers. To point out their approach, they provide an ex-
ample of an option contract in the area of supply chain management. In the
5
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example, they consider a general single buyer-single supplier contract with peri-
odical commitment of options as introduced by Barnes-Schuster et al. [4]. They
assume stochastic demand. They consider the buyer’s point of view and maxi-
mize the profit of the buyer. Furthermore, they make the assumption that the
decision variables do not have any effect on the underlying stochastic process and
the stochastic process is discrete with discrete or a discretized state space. They
use event tree representation to formalize the process. In addition, they perform
numerical studies to show the reliability of their approach.
Chen and Parlar [8] extend the standard newsvendor problem by introducing
a put option into it, so that the risk-averse newsvendor protects himself against
lower than expected demand. The objective of their work is to analyze the value
of a put option to a risk-averse newsvendor. They discuss the cases where the
newsvendor decides on the strike price and/or the strike quantity besides the
order quantity to enhance the risk return profile. They assume that the option is
priced using historical demand data Hull [5], and information is symmetric. They
showed that the optimal order quantity is independent of the use of option. That
is, the option parameters do not impact the newsvendor’s expected profit, whereas
they impact the variance of the profit. Furthermore, it is shown that as long as
the utility function of the newsvendor is quadratic and the order quantity that
maximizes the expected profit is used, the buyer is indifferent between maximizing
the expected utility and minimizing the variance of the profit.
The problem of hedging in the newsvendor setting when perfect or partial
correlation of demand of the item with the price of a tradable financial asset is
assumed is considered by Gaur and Seshadri [6]. They handle this problem for
discretionary purchase items based on a forecasting model combining the personal
opinion of the retailer with the price information of the underlying asset. The
objective of their work is to derive an optimal hedging strategy that minimizes the
variance of the profit and increases the expected utility for a risk-averse decision
maker. Unlike previous research, they analyze the effect of hedging on decision
making. They show that hedging has an effect on both risk-neutral and risk-
averse decision makers in a way that it reduces the variance of the profit and the
investment in inventory, whereas it increases the expected utility of a risk-averse
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decision maker and optimal inventory level for a wide range of utility functions.
Furthermore, they present a numerical example to point out the results of their
model.
Barnes-Schuster et al. [7] study the role of options in a buyer-supplier system
by considering a two-period correlated demand model. They assume that before
the beginning of the horizon, the retailer places firm orders to be delivered at the
beginning of periods 1 and 2 at the same unit price and purchases options from the
supplier that allow him to order additional units in period 2 after observing the
actual demand of period 1 by paying an exercise price. The flexibility of the buyer
to adjust order quantity of period 2 to the observed demand of period 1 provided
by options is highlighted. Furthermore, in analyzing the model various channel
structures are considered and performance of them are numerically compared.
The problem of valuing a supply contract that requires the manufacturer to
deliver fixed quantities of a finished good according to a deterministic delivery
schedule at a predetermined unit price is considered by Kamrad and Ritchken
[9]. They formulate the problem using a contingent claims approach since it re-
quires less data and more fully exploits market information. In addition, they
assume that the input price processes are correlated Ito processes with general
drift components, and are constrained only in their volatility structures. The goal
of their paper is to formulate a model valuing a fixed price supply contract char-
acterized by multiple input price uncertainty and significant operating flexibility.
Even though the formulation of their model follows arbitrage pricing procedures,
it does not yield analytical solutions. Therefore, they establish a multinomial
lattice approximation procedure that allows optimal solutions to be obtained. In
addition, they present an example that illustrates the valuation procedure and
highlights how the value of supply contracts with flexibility can be determined.
Chapter 3
Review of Financial Markets
3.1 Arbitrage and Martingales
In this section, financial markets and the concepts of arbitrage and martingales
are introduced. The link between arbitrage and martingales is analyzed.
A financial market is a mechanism that allows people to buy and sell financial
securities. (It is also the coming together of buyers and sellers to trade financial
securities.)
Throughout the thesis we consider the general probabilistic setting of [1]. We
assume that all random quantities are supported on a finite probability space
(Ω,F , P ) whose atoms ω are sequences of real valued vectors (security prices
and payments) over the discrete time periods t = 0, 1, . . . , T . In addition, we
assume that the market evolves as a discrete scenario tree. In the scenario tree,
the partition of probability atoms ω ∈ Ω which are generated by matching path
histories up to time t corresponds one-to-one with nodes n ∈ Nt at level t in the
tree. The root node n = 0 corresponds to trivial partition N0 = Ω, and the leaf
nodes n ∈ NT correspond one-to-one with the probability atoms ω ∈ Ω.
8
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Figure 3.1: Financial Market Scenario Tree
As represented in the figure above in the scenario tree, every node n ∈ Nt
for t = 1, . . . , T has a unique parent node denoted by a (n) ∈ Nt−1, and every
node n ∈ Nt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 has a nonempty set of child nodes denoted by
C (n) ⊂ Nt+1.
The probability distribution P is modeled by assigning positive weights pn to
each leaf node n ∈ NT . The weights pn are assigned to each leaf node n ∈ NT in
such a way that
∑
n∈NT pn = 1. Each intermediate level node in the tree receives
a probability mass equal to the combined mass of the paths passing through it.
pn =
∑
m∈C(n)
pm ∀n ∈ Nt, t = T − 1, . . . , 0.
The ratios pm/pn, m ∈ Cn, are the conditional probabilities that the child
node m occurs given that the parent node n = a (m) has occurred.
The function X : Ω→ R is a real-valued random variable if {ω : X (ω) ≤ r} ∈
F ∀r ∈ R. Let X be a real-valued random variable. X can be lifted to Nt if it
can be assigned a value on each node of Nt that is consistent with its definition
on Ω, [1]. This kind of random variable is said to be measurable with respect
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to the information contained in the nodes of Nt. A stochastic process {Xt} is a
time indexed collection of random variables such that each Xt is measurable with
respect to Nt. The expected value of Xt is uniquely defined by
EP [Xt] :=
∑
n∈Nt
pnXn.
The conditional expectation of Xt+1 on Nt
EP [Xt+1|Nt] :=
∑
m∈C(n)
pm
pn
Xm
is a random variable taking values over the nodes n ∈ Nt.
The market consists of J + 1 tradable securities indexed by j = 0, 1, . . . , J
with prices at node n given by the vector Sn =
(
S0n, . . . , S
J
n
)
. Suppose one of
the securities always has strictly positive values at each node of the scenario tree.
Let security 0 be such security. This security which corresponds to the risk-free
asset in the classical valuation framework is chosen to be nume´raire. Introducing
the discount factors βn = 1/S
0
n we define the discounted security prices relative
to the nume´raire and denote it by Zn =
(
Z0n, . . . , Z
J
n
)
where ZJn = βnS
J
n for
j = 0, 1, . . . , J . Note that, Z0n = 1 in any state n.
The amount of security j held by the investor in state n ∈ Nt is denoted by
θjn. The value of the portfolio discounted with respect to the nume´raire in state
n is
Zn · θn :=
J∑
j=0
Zjnθ
j
n.
Throughout the thesis, we will use the following definition of arbitrage: An
arbitrage is a sequence of portfolio holdings that begins with a zero initial value,
makes self-financing portfolio transactions and attains a non-negative value in
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each future state, while in at least one terminal state it attains a strictly positive
value with positive probability.
The condition of self-financing portfolio transactions
Zn · θn = Zn · θa(n) n > 0
states that the funds available for investment at state n are restricted to the funds
generated by the price changes in the portfolio held at state a (n).
The following optimization problem, called a stochastic program, is used to
find an arbitrage.
max
∑
n∈NT
pnZn · θn
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 = 0
Zn ·
[
θn − θa(n)
]
= 0, ∀n ∈ Nt, t ≥ 1
Zn · θn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NT
A positive optimal value for this stochastic program corresponds to an arbi-
trage. The solution that yields a positive optimal value can be turned into an
arbitrage as shown by Harrison and Pliska [10]. On the other hand if no arbitrage
is possible, the price process is called an arbitrage-free market price process.
A martingale is a stochastic process such that the expected value of the next
observation, given all the past observations, is equal to the last observation. Mar-
tingale properties needed for our study are formalized in the following definition.
Definition 1 If there exists a probability measure Q = {qn}n∈Nt such that
Zt = E
Q [Zt+1 |Nt] (t ≤ T − 1) (3.1)
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then the vector process {Zt} is called a vector-valued martingale under Q, and Q
is called a martingale probability measure (MPM) for the process.
We further need the following definition.
Definition 2 A discrete probability measure Q = {qn}n∈Nt is said to be equivalent
to a discrete probability measure P = {pn}n∈Nt if qn > 0 exactly when pn > 0.
The key link between arbitrage and martingales is proved by King in the
following theorem (c.f. Theorem 1 of [1]).
Theorem 1 The discrete state stochastic vector process {Zt} is an arbitrage-free
market price process if and only if there is at least one probability measure Q
equivalent to P under which {Zt} is a martingale.
3.2 Financing of Contingent Claims and Posi-
tions of the Writer and the Buyer
A contingent claim F is a security that has payouts Fn, n > 0 depending on
the states n of the market. Currency futures and equity options are examples
of traded contingent claims. The minimum initial investment needed to generate
payouts Fn through self-financing transactions using a riskless asset and the un-
derlying security with no risk of terminal positions being negative at any state
can be captured in a stochastic program. The following stochastic program de-
termines the minimum amount F0 required to hedge the claim F that produces
payouts Fn with no risk.
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min F0
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 = F0
Zn ·
[
θn − θa(n)
]
= −βnFn ∀n ∈ Nt, t ≥ 1
Zn ·Θn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT
King proved the following (c.f. Proposition 2 of [1]):
Proposition 1 Let Fn be a contingent claim on an arbitrage-free market price
process {Zt}. The claim is attainable if and only if its price F0 satisfies
β0F0 ≥ max
Q∈M
EQ
[
T∑
t=1
βtFt
]
(3.2)
where M = {Q : Zt = EQ [Zt+1 |Nt] (t ≤ T − 1)} , and maxQ∈MEQ [∑Tt=1 βtFt]
is the maximum expected value of the discounted payouts over all possible mar-
tingale measures.
3.2.1 Position of the Writer
This section analyzes the position of the writer of the contingent claim. The
writer of the claim receives F0 from the buyer of the claim at state n = 0 and
pays Fn in each state n > 0 in the future. In the meantime, the writer invests
this money to generate a profit in such a way as to maximize expected value at
the end of the horizon while hedging the claim. The problem of the writer can
be modeled as the stochastic program
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max
∑
n∈NT
pnZn · θn
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 = β0F0
Zn ·
[
θn − θa(n)
]
= −βnFn ∀n ∈ Nt, t ≥ 1
Zn · θn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT .
The necessary and the sufficient condition needed for the writer’s problem to
have an optimal solution and the condition on the price F0 charged by the writer
are derived in the following theorem. (c.f. Theorem 2 of [1]).
Theorem 2 The writer’s problem has an optimum if and only if
1. The collection of equivalent martingale probability measures on the market
price process {Zt} is nonempty, and
2. The price F0 charged by the writer to generate payouts Fn satisfies
β0F0 ≥ max
Q∈M
EQ
[
T∑
t=1
βtFt
]
. (3.3)
Furthermore, this price is invariant under the changes of the original probability
measure P .
Therefore, the writer’s minimum acceptable price to sell the claim is
Fwriter0 = β
−1
0 max
Q∈M
EQ
[
T∑
t=1
βtFt
]
. (3.4)
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3.2.2 Position of the Buyer
This section analyzes the position of the buyer of the contingent claim. The buyer
of the claim pays F0 to the writer at state n = 0 and receives payments Fn in
each state n > 0 in the future. Like the writer, the buyer wishes to maximize
expected value at the end of the horizon by trading. The problem of the buyer
can be modeled as the following stochastic program
max
∑
n∈NT
pnZn · θn
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 = −β0F0
Zn ·
[
θn − θa(n)
]
= βnFn ∀n ∈ Nt, t ≥ 1
Zn · θn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT .
The results derived for the writer’s problem are independent of the sign of
F . Therefore, the buyer’s acceptable price to buy the claim can be computed by
reversing the signs in the equation derived in the writer’s problem. Hence, the
buyer’s acceptable price F0 satisfies
β0F0 ≤ min
Q∈M
EQ
[
T∑
t=1
βtFt
]
. (3.5)
Therefore, the buyer’s maximum acceptable price to buy the claim is
F buyer0 = β
−1
0 min
Q∈M
EQ
[
T∑
t=1
βtFt
]
. (3.6)
Chapter 4
Model
In this part of the thesis, a model for the financial valuation of supply chain
contract is introduced. We consider a general single buyer-single supplier contract
having periodical commitment with options. We consider the case where the
demand forecast for the item is perfectly correlated with the price of an underlying
security traded in the financial markets.
The general setting of the contract is as follows. The buyer is an intermediary
between the market and the supplier. He buys the finished products from the
supplier and sells them to customers at the end market at a fixed market price
that is exogenously specified. The demand of the customers at the end market is
assumed to be uncertain.
The buyer and the supplier sign a multiple period quantity flexibility contract,
in which the buyer has options to buy in case of a higher than expected demand
in addition to the committed purchases at the beginning of each period of the
contract.
In our study, we assume that the demand of the customers for the finished
products is uncertain, i.e., demand follows a stochastic process. We further as-
sume that this stochastic process evolves as a discrete scenario tree. We now
describe the scenario tree in more detail.
16
CHAPTER 4. MODEL 17
The nodes of the scenario tree represent the state of the discrete state stochas-
tic process at a given period. The arcs correspond to the probabilistic transitions
from one node at a given period to another node at the next period. As repre-
sented in the figure below there exists exactly one arc leading to a node, while
there may be many arcs emanating from a node. As in the financial market
scenario tree we denote the nodes obtained by the arcs emanating from node n,
n ∈ Nt for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 by C (n) ⊂ Nt+1, and the unique node that gives rise
to node n, n ∈ Nt for t = 1, . . . , T by a (n) ∈ Nt−1.
Figure 4.1: Demand Market Scenario Tree
Now, consider a periodic review inventory problem with horizon T . The deci-
sions made by the buyer at the beginning of the horizon are as follows. The buyer
orders Qt units to be delivered in period t for t = 1, . . . , T at a unit purchase price
of pt. We refer to Qt as firm orders. In addition, the buyer purchases options from
the supplier which give him an opportunity to purchase additional units later by
paying an exercise price. We assume that one option gives the buyer a right to
purchase one additional unit of product, and this additional unit is delivered at
the beginning of the next period that the option is exercised. We further assume
that the number of options exercised by the buyer at each node n, n ∈ Nt for
t = 1, . . . , T − 1 is bounded above by a constant M . In each state n, n ∈ Nt for
t = 1, . . . , T − 1, after observing the actual demand of node n, the buyer decides
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to exercise options or not. If at state n for n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 the buyer
decides to exercise mn options at a unit price of et where mn ≤M , the additional
units are delivered at the beginning of period t+ 1.
In each period t for t = 1, . . . , T−1 excess demand is assumed to be backlogged
to the next period at the unit shortage cost st. However, at the end of the
horizon shortage is not allowed. In addition, in each period t, t = 1, . . . , T , excess
inventory is carried to the next period at the unit holding cost of ht.
One of our most important initial assumptions is that demand forecast for
the item is perfectly correlated with the price of a risky security traded in the
financial market. This actually implies that the scenario tree of the financial
market and the demand market coincide as shown in the figure below.
Figure 4.2: Financial and Demand Market Scenario Tree
Before moving on to the mathematical formulation of the model, we now
summarize the notations that will be used throughout the thesis.
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4.1 Notations
Decision Variables
Qt : Firm order to be delivered in period t
θn : The vector amount of securities held at node n
mn : Number of options exercised at node n
V : Value of the contract
I+n : Positive inventory at the end of node n
I−n : Negative inventory at the end of node n
In : Net inventory at the end of node n
VM : Contract value when the buyer is allowed to exercise at most M options
Parameters
M : Maximum number of options that can be exercised at node n
rt : Sales price of finished product at the end market in period t
pt : Purchase price of unit firm order Qt in period t
ht : Unit holding cost for finished products in period t
st : Unit stock-out cost for finished products in period t
Zn: The vector of security prices at node n
Dn : Demand at node n
et : Unit price for an option exercised in period t
4.2 Assumptions
• The demand forecast for the item is perfectly correlated with the price of
an underlying security traded in the financial markets.
• In the financial market, the price process {Zt} is an arbitrage-free market
price process. This is equivalent to the existence of a martingale probability
measure Q for the price process {Zt}.
• At each state n, n ∈ Nt for t = 1, . . . , T −1, the buyer is allowed to exercise
at most M options and the options exercised are delivered at the beginning
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of period t+ 1.
• In the real market, in period t for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 excess demand is back-
logged and excess inventory is carried to the next period. However, at the
end of the horizon, shortage is not allowed.
• The backorders are met at the present price.
• To avoid the trivial cases it is assumed that the sales price rt is greater than
the purchase price pt and the stock-out cost st is greater than the holding
cost ht in period t for t = 1, . . . , T .
Before moving on to the mathematical formulation of the model, we now
explain the main motivation of our model and discuss the financial constraints.
In Section 3.2.2, the position of the buyer of the contingent claim who pays F0
at state n = 0 and receives payments Fn in each future state n > 0 is discussed.
In the thesis, we extend this analysis and study the financial and real markets
simultaneously. We analyze the problem of the buyer who borrows money at the
beginning of the horizon by making short sales of stocks to acquire the contract
and buy bonds with the rest of the money. The buyer then repays his debts by
making self-financing transactions in the financial market and cash flows gener-
ated in the real market.
The goal of our study is to find the maximum value that the buyer will accept
to pay for the contract. Hence the objective function is formulated in such a way
to maximize the value of the contract that the buyer will accept to pay. Since the
portfolio of the buyer was zero before borrowing money, and the money borrowed
at the beginning of the horizon is used to acquire the contract and buy bonds to
later trade in the financial market, the portfolio of stocks, bonds and the value
of the contract must add up to zero.
The portfolio value at each node n, Zn ·θn, is composed of the portfolio value of
parent node a (n), Zn·θa(n), and the cash flow generated in the real market at node
n denoted by Fn. Therefore, the following equation describes the self-financing
nature of portfolio transactions:
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Zn · θn = Zn · θa(n) + Fn,
or,
Zn ·
(
θn − θa(n)
)
= Fn.
Denote θn − θa(n) by ∆θn then we have
Zn ·∆θn = Fn.
With the above specifications, our model that we refer to as (P1) can be
formulated as follows.
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maxV
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 + V = 0 (4.1)
Zn ·∆θn = r1
(
Dn − I−n
)− (p1Q1 + e1mn + h1I+n + s1I−n ) ∀n ∈ N1
(4.2)
Zn ·∆θn = rt
(
Dn − I−n + I−a(n)
)
− (ptQt + etmn + htI+n + stI−n ) ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 2, . . . , T − 1
(4.3)
Zn ·∆θn = rT
(
Dn + I
−
a(n)
)
− (pTQT + hT In) ∀n ∈ NT
(4.4)
Zn · θn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT
(4.5)
In = Q1 −Dn ∀n ∈ N1
(4.6)
In = Ia(n) +Qt +ma(n) −Dn ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 2, . . . , T
(4.7)
In = I
+
n − I−n ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(4.8)
In ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT
(4.9)
mn ≤M ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(4.10)
Qt ≥ 0 t = 1, . . . , T
(4.11)
I+n ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T
(4.12)
I−n ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(4.13)
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Constraint 4.2 implies that Fn for n ∈ N1 is the revenue in period 1, which is
the amount of the product sold at a unit sales price of r1, minus the expenditure
in period 1, which is the firm order at a unit purchase price of p1, the amount of
options exercised to be used in the second period at a unit exercise price of e1,
the positive inventory at a unit cost of h1 and the backorder amount at a unit
cost of s1.
Fn = r1
(
Dn − I−n
)− (p1Q1 + e1mn + h1I+n + s1I−n ) ∀n ∈ N1
Constraint 4.3 states that Fn for n ∈ Nt, t = 2, . . . , T − 1 is the revenue
in period t, t = 2, . . . , T − 1, that is the demand at node n plus the backorder
amount at node a (n) minus the shortage at node n at a unit sales price of rt,
minus the expenditure in period t, t = 2, . . . , T − 1, that is, the firm order, the
number of options exercised in period t to be used in period t + 1, the positive
inventory and the backorder amount at unit prices of pt, et, ht and st.
Fn = rt
(
Dn − I−n + I−a(n)
)
−(ptQt + etmn + htI+n + stI−n ) ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 2, . . . , T−1
Constraint 4.4 ensures that Fn for n ∈ NT is the revenue in the last period,
which is the demand at node n plus the backorder amount coming from parent
node a (n) at a unit sales price of rT since shortage is not allowed in the last
period , minus the expenditure, which is the firm order at a unit purchase price
pT plus the positive inventory held at node n at a unit cost of hT since in the last
period options cannot be exercised and shortage is not allowed.
Fn = rT
(
Dn + I
−
a(n)
)
− (pTQT + hT In) ∀n ∈ NT
Constraint 4.5 guarantees that the value of the portfolio in the terminal states
are non-negative. This is needed to assure that the buyer has repaid all the debts.
Constraints 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 are the inventory balance constraints. Con-
straint 4.6 implies that in the first period, the net inventory at each state n,
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n ∈ N1 is equal to the firm order for period 1 minus the demand at that node
since there is no backorder to cover or positive inventory carried from the previous
period.
Constraint 4.7 states that in period t, t = 2, . . . , T the net inventory at each
state n, n ∈ Nt is equal to the sum of the net inventory of the parent node a (n),
the firm order of period t and the number of options exercised in period t− 1 to
be delivered in period t minus the demand at state n. The reason is that except
the first period, the buyer is allowed to have inventory either positive or negative
coming from the previous periods. Furthermore, the buyer has an opportunity
to use options that bring him as many additional units as the number of options
exercised.
Constraint 4.8 implies that in period t, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, the net inventory at
any node is equal to positive inventory minus the negative inventory at that node.
However the net inventory in the last period is simply the positive inventory. This
is due to the fact that shortage is not allowed at the end of the horizon. This is
guaranteed in constraint 4.9.
Constraint 4.10 shows the flexibility of the buyer. It states that at any node
that the buyer is allowed to exercise options which is all the periods except the
last period, he is permitted to exercise at most M options.
Chapter 5
Analysis of Optimal Solutions via
Duality
This section analyzes the problem discussed in Chapter 4 through an equivalent
problem called the dual. We first examine the financial constraints in the dual
corresponding to the decision variables θn for n ∈ Nt, t = 0, . . . , T . The first step
in calculating the dual is to assign dual variables to each constraint in the model.
We assign qn as dual variables for all the nodes of the financial constraints (4.1)-
(4.4), and wn for the non-negativity constraint of the portfolio in the terminal
nodes, that is constraint (4.5), ∀n ∈ NT .
Firstly, the dual constraint corresponding to the decision variable V , that is
the value of the contract, is
q0 = 1. (5.1)
Next, the dual constraint corresponding to θn, n ∈ Nt for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 is
the martingale condition
qnZn =
∑
m∈C(n)
qmZm n ∈ Nt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1. (5.2)
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The dual constraint corresponding to the decision variables θn for n ∈ NT is
(qn + wn)Zn = 0 n ∈ NT ,
and since the first component Z0n = 1 for all states n we have
qn + wn = 0 n ∈ NT .
In addition, by the non-negativity of the portfolio in the terminal positions
wn ≤ 0 n ∈ NT .
Finally, combining the above two constraints, one has the following constraint
in the dual.
qn ≥ 0 n ∈ NT . (5.3)
Next, we analyze the constraints in the dual arising from the constraints of the
real market. We assign yn as dual variables for the inventory balance constraints
(4.6) and (4.7), ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T , kn for the constraint (4.8), ∀n ∈ Nt, t =
1, . . . , T −1, and fn for the flexibility constraint (4.10), ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T −1.
The dual constraint corresponding to the firm orders Qt is
∑
n∈Nt
ptqn + yn ≥ 0 t = 1, . . . , T. (5.4)
The constraint in the dual arising from the number of options exercised, i.e.
mn, n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 is
etqn + fn +
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1. (5.5)
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The dual constraint corresponding to the net inventory at state n, n ∈ Nt, t =
1, . . . , T − 1 is
−yn +
∑
m∈C(n)
ym + kn = 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Reformulating the above constraint, one obtains
kn = yn −
∑
m∈C(n)
ym n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
The constraint in the dual arising from the positive inventory at state n,
n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 is
htqn − kn ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
and the constraint in the dual arising from the negative inventory at state n,
n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 is
(rt + st) qn − rt+1
∑
m∈C(n)
qm + kn ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Replacing kn by yn −
∑
m∈C(n) ym one has the following constraints in the
dual corresponding to, respectively, positive and negative inventory at state n,
n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1
htqn − yn +
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (5.6)
(rt + st) qn−rt+1
∑
m∈C(n)
qm+yn−
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T −1. (5.7)
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Finally, the dual constraint corresponding to the net inventory at the terminal
positions which is also the positive inventory since shortages are not allowed in
the last period is
hT qn − yn ≥ 0 n ∈ NT . (5.8)
To obtain the objective function of the dual program we leave the parameters
of the model at the right hand side and multiply them by respective dual variables.
Therefore, the dual program that we refer to as (D1) is formulated as follows.
min
T∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
Dn (rtqn + yn) +M
T−1∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
fn
s.t.
(5.1)− (5.8)
fn ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
The basic theorem of linear programming states that problem (P1) has an
optimal solution if and only if the dual (D1) does too, and both optimal values are
equal. Furthermore, it follows again from the theory of linear programming that
problem (P1) has an optimal solution if and only if it is feasible and bounded.
Moreover, (P1) is bounded if and only if there exists at least one probability
measure Q under which the price process {Zt} is martingale, and there exists yn
and fn satisfying (5.4) - (5.8).
Now, assume the financial market is arbitrage-free. Then, we can summarize
our findings above in the result below.
Theorem 3 The maximum value that the buyer will accept to pay for the con-
tract is
min
Q∈M
{
T∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
Dn (rtqn + y
∗
n) +M
T−1∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
f ∗n
}
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS VIA DUALITY 29
where y∗ and f ∗ are the optimal solution of the following linear program that we
refer to as (D2).
min
T∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
Dnyn +M
T−1∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
fn
s.t.∑
n∈Nt
yn ≥ −
∑
n∈Nt
ptqn t = 1, . . . , T (5.9)
fn +
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ −etqn n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 (5.10)
yn −
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≤ htqn n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 (5.11)
yn −
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ rt+1
∑
m∈C(n)
qm − (rt + st) qn n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 (5.12)
yn ≤ hT qn n ∈ NT (5.13)
fn ≥ 0 n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 (5.14)
From the theorem above, we make the following observations:
Observation 1 It is obvious that if f ∗n = 0, an increase in the value of M does
not have any effect on the value of the contract since
M
T−1∑
t=1
∑
n∈Nt
f ∗n = 0.
This actually means that the buyer is flexible enough to exercise as many
options as he wants even before an increase in the value of M , that is, the primal
constraints corresponding to fn for n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 are all non-binding.
We will observe the effects of exercise price and purchase price on the value
of the contract under the following assumptions.
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1. fn = 0 for n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T−1. That is, the buyer has enough flexibility
to exercise as many options as he wants.
2. Before any changes p1 = p2 = . . . = pT . That is, unit cost of placing a firm
order is the same at all the periods.
Before moving on to the observations we will reorganize the constraints of
(D2).
Constraint 5.10 exists ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1. Writing the constraints 5.10
for a fixed t and summing them ∀n ∈ Nt we have
∑
n∈Nt
fn +
∑
n∈Nt
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ −
∑
n∈Nt
etqn.
Furthermore by the assumption
∑
n∈Nt fn = 0. Therefore, one obtains
∑
n∈Nt
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ −
∑
n∈Nt
etqn. (5.15)
Similar to constraint 5.10, constraint 5.11 exists ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Hence, writing the constraints 5.11 for a fixed t and summing them ∀n ∈ Nt we
have
∑
n∈Nt
yn −
∑
n∈Nt
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≤
∑
n∈Nt
htqn.
Reorganizing the above constraint one can obtain
∑
n∈Nt
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥
∑
n∈Nt
yn −
∑
n∈Nt
htqn. (5.16)
In addition, constraint 5.9 can be rewritten as
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0 ≥ −
∑
n∈Nt
yn −
∑
n∈Nt
ptqn. (5.17)
Summing the constraints 5.16 and 5.17 we obtain
∑
n∈Nt
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ −
∑
n∈Nt
(pt + ht) qn. (5.18)
Finally, constraints 5.15 and 5.18 imply that
∑
n∈Nt
∑
m∈C(n)
ym ≥ max
{
−
∑
n∈Nt
(pt + ht) qn,−
∑
n∈Nt
etqn
}
. (5.19)
Having obtained the above constraint we make the following observations.
Proposition 2 If pt + ht ≤ et, decreasing the purchase price of period t, t =
1, . . . , T−1, while leaving the purchase prices of other periods unchanged increases
the value of the contract.
Proof : From constraint 5.19, if pt + ht ≤ et, i.e.,
max
{
−
∑
n∈Nt
(pt + ht) qn,−
∑
n∈Nt
etqn
}
= −
∑
n∈Nt
(pt + ht) qn
decreasing pt decreases
∑
n∈Nt (pt + ht) qn and hence increases
(−∑n∈Nt (pt + ht) qn).
This implies that an increase in the lower bound of our minimization program.
Hence, y∗n achieve bigger values. This, moreover, increases the value of the con-
tract.
On the other hand, if pt + ht ≥ et then −
∑
n∈Nt etqn ≥ −
∑
n∈Nt (pt + ht) qn.
Therefore, decreasing pt decreases
∑
n∈Nt (pt + ht) qn and hence increases(−∑n∈Nt (pt + ht) qn), butmax{−∑nıNt (pt + ht) qn,−∑n∈Nt etqn} = −∑n∈Nt etqn
and y∗n, n ∈ Nt+1 does not change unless pt is decreased to a value such that
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pt + ht ≤ et. Hence change in the value of the contract depends on the con-
straint 5.9. If it is binding decreasing pt decreases
∑
n∈Nt ptqn and hence in-
creases − (∑n∈Nt ptqn). This means that an increase in the lower bound of our
minimization program. Hence, y∗n achieve bigger values. This, moreover, increases
the value of the contract. 
Proposition 3 If et ≤ pt + ht decreasing the exercise price of period t, i.e., et,
while the exercise prices of other periods are unchanged increases the value of the
contract.
Proof : From constraint 5.19 a change in et, changes y
∗
n, n ∈ Nt+1 if the maximum
in constraint 5.19 is obtained by − (∑n∈Nt etqn). This happens when et ≤ pt+ht.
Therefore, if et ≤ pt + ht decreasing et decreases
∑
n∈Nt etqn and hence increases
− (∑n∈Nt etqn). This means that that an increase in the lower bound of our
minimization program. Hence, y∗n achieve bigger values. This, moreover, increases
the value of the contract. 
The impacts of the rest of the parameters are not independent of the other
parameters. Therefore, the analysis of these parameters are studied in the next
chapter by taking the relative positions of the parameters into consideration.
Chapter 6
Experimental Study
In the previous chapter, the effects of buyer flexibility, exercise price and purchase
price on the value of the contract were analyzed analytically. In this chapter
the analysis of these parameters are done numerically and are extended to all
parameters to give a better understanding of the previous chapter. In addition,
the effect of the parameters on the cost of the flexibility provided by the use of
options is studied. We refer to this cost as the option value. In order to observe
how a change in the value of the parameter affects the value of the option, both
the value of the contract withM = 0 andM > 0 is examined. Then the difference
is taken to find the value of the option as the model we study has an operating
profit even when the use of option is not allowed. For simplicity we first make
all the analysis in a two-period model and consider the binomial tree shown in
Figure 6.1. A three-period model is considered when need arises. For all the
analysis, we assume that there is only one risky security and one riskless asset.
33
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 34
Figure 6.1: Two-Period Binomial Tree
As can be seen from Figure 6.1
N0 = {0}, N1 = {1, 2}, N2 = {3, 4, 5, 6}
a (1) = 0, a (2) = 0
a (3) = 1, a (4) = 1
a (5) = 2, a (6) = 2
Zn = (Z
0
n, Z
1
n) n = 0, . . . , 6
where Z0n denotes the price of the riskless asset, and Z
1
n denotes the price of the
risky security.
Before we move on to the analysis, in order to make our model more clear we
write our model for the two-period case explicitly.
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maxV
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 + V = 0 (6.1)
Z1 · (θ1 − θ0) = r1
(
D1 − I−1
)− (p1Q1 + e1m1 + h1I+1 + s1I−1 ) (6.2)
Z2 · (θ2 − θ0) = r1
(
D2 − I−2
)− (p1Q1 + e1m2 + h1I+2 + s1I−2 ) (6.3)
Z3 · (θ3 − θ1) = r2
(
D3 + I
−
1
)− (p2Q2 + h2I3) (6.4)
Z4 · (θ4 − θ1) = r2
(
D4 + I
−
1
)− (p2Q2 + h2I4) (6.5)
Z5 · (θ5 − θ2) = r2
(
D5 + I
−
2
)− (p2Q2 + h2I5) (6.6)
Z6 · (θ6 − θ2) = r2
(
D6 + I
−
2
)− (p2Q2 + h2I6) (6.7)
Zn · θn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N2 (6.8)
I1 = Q1 −D1 (6.9)
I2 = Q1 −D2 (6.10)
I3 = I1 +Q2 +m1 −D3 (6.11)
I4 = I1 +Q2 +m1 −D4 (6.12)
I5 = I2 +Q2 +m2 −D5 (6.13)
I6 = I2 +Q2 +m2 −D6 (6.14)
I1 = I
+
1 − I−1 (6.15)
I2 = I
+
2 − I−2 (6.16)
In ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N2 (6.17)
m1 ≤M (6.18)
m2 ≤M (6.19)
Q1 ≥ 0 (6.20)
Q2 ≥ 0 (6.21)
I+1 ≥ 0 (6.22)
I+2 ≥ 0 (6.23)
I−1 ≥ 0 (6.24)
I−2 ≥ 0 (6.25)
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During the analysis, stock is chosen as an underlying security. In order to
observe the effect of volatility of stock prices, the stock prices are chosen in such
a way that the average price remains constant at all periods:
Z0 = (Z1 + Z2) /2 = (Z3 + Z4 + Z5 + Z6) /4.
Similar to stock prices, demand values are chosen in a way that the average
values are constant in all the periods so that effect of demand volatility can be
observed.
(D1 +D2) /2 = (D3 +D4 +D5 +D6) /4.
Taking the above specifications into consideration, the values of the param-
eters and the corresponding decision variables in a base case are represented in
Table 6.1. The value of the contract denoted by VM is 146.7857 and the value of
the option is VM − V0 = 146.7857− 81.1607 = 65.625.
Parameters Decision Var. n Z0n Z
1
n Dn θ
0
n θ
1
n Fn
Q1 = 45 0 10 15 45.902 -62.754
rt = 20 Q2 = 20 1 12 20 45 -13.064 -26.875 10
pt = 12 V0 = 416.68 2 12 10 25 19.767 -38.393 -70
ht = 1.5 VM = 482.30 3 14.4 25 55 860
st = 2.5 I
+
2 = 20 4 14.4 5 30 322.5
M = 100 I4 = 25 5 14.4 22 40 560
e = 10 I6 = 25 6 14.4 8 15 22.5
Table 6.1: Parameters and the decision variables in base case
Now, we will investigate how the value of the option and the contract is
affected by the changes in the value of the parameters and compare the results
of this chapter with the previous chapter. Throughout the analysis, graphs are
formed by taking the sample size of the parameters large enough to recognize the
general pattern and in the graphs solid lines represent the value of the contract
and the dashed lines represent the value of the option.
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Case 1 : Effect of Buyer Flexibility
The buyer is allowed to purchase options from the supplier at the beginning
of the horizon to later exercise and obtain additional units. The buyer, however,
is not fully flexible to adjust order quantities to the observed demands. At each
state n, n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, he is allowed to exercise at most M options.
Thus, the flexibility available to the buyer, that is the value of M , plays an
important role on determining the value of the contract and the option. The
value of the contract and the option corresponding to the different values of M
are presented in Table 6.2. The values of other parameters are taken as in the
base case.
M V0 VM VM − V0 m1
100 416.68 482.3 65.62 35
35 416.68 482.3 65.62 35
30 416.68 472.93 56.25 30
Table 6.2: Decision variables in case 1
The first row of Table 6.2 states that if the buyer is allowed to exercise at
most 100 options while the values of the rest of the parameters are taken as in
the base case, the buyer exercises 35 options in node 1. The value of the contract
is VM = 482.3 and the value of the option is VM − V0 = 65.62.
If the value of M decreases to 35 while the values of the other parameters are
kept unchanged, the buyer still exercises 35 options. This implies that the buyer
is still flexible enough to follow the base case scenario. Therefore, neither the
value of the contract nor the value of the option changes.
Next, we observe that decreasing the flexibility of the buyer to 30 options
decreases the value of the contract and the option, respectively, to 472.93 and
56.25. This is due to the fact that the buyer is not flexible enough to exercise
as many options as he wants. Therefore, the buyer places more firm orders to
meet the demand in case of higher than expected demand. Since the buyer is not
flexible enough to respond to market changes and places more firm orders which
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may also result in an increase in positive inventory, both the value of the contract
and the option decrease.
To summarize, as shown in the figure below the values of the contract and
the option are unchanged as long as the buyer is flexible enough to exercise the
amount used in the base case. However, decreasing the value of M to an amount
lower than the amount of options exercised in the base case decreases the values
of the contract and the option.
Figure 6.2: Contract and Option Values vs M
Case 2 : Effect of Exercise Price
The buyer has a limited flexibility to purchase options from the supplier at the
beginning of the horizon. The buyer then use these options to obtain additional
units by paying an exercise price. Thus, the price that the buyer pays to exercise
options affects the values of the option and the contract. The values of the
contract and the option corresponding to the different values of exercise prices
are summarized in Table 6.3. The values of other parameters are taken as in the
base case.
e V0 V100 V100 − V0 m1 m2
10 416.68 482.3 65.62 35
11 416.68 458.97 42.29 35
9 416.68 522.3 105.62 55 20
Table 6.3: Decision variables in case 2
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The first row in Table 6.3 states that if in the contract it is agreed that the
buyer pays exercise price 10 to obtain one additional unit of product while the
values of the rest of the parameters are as in the base case, the buyer exercises
35 options. In addition, the values of the contract and the option, respectively,
are 482.3 and 65.62.
If the exercise price is increased to 11, the value of the contract and the
option, respectively, decreases to 458.97 and 42.29. This is due to the fact that it
becomes more expensive to adjust order quantities to the observed demands by
exercising options. This implies that the contract becomes less valuable for the
buyer. Thus, the buyer is willing to pay less for the contract.
Next we observe that a decrease in the exercise price results in an increase
in both the value of the contract and the option. As summarized in Table 6.3
when exercise price is decreased to 9, the value of the contract and the option,
respectively, increases to 522.3 and 105.62. This is so because it becomes cheaper
to adjust order quantities by exercising options. Therefore, the contract becomes
more profitable for the buyer and he accepts to pay more for the contract.
To summarize, as shown in the figure below, as long as options are used to
meet the demand, the values of the contract and the option decrease with an
increase in the exercise price, whereas they both increase with a decrease in the
exercise price.
Figure 6.3: Contract and Option Values vs Exercise Price
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Case 3 : Effect of Purchase Price
At the beginning of the horizon, the buyer gives firm orders Qt to be delivered
in period t, t = 1, . . . , T at a unit purchase price of pt. Hence, the value of the
purchase price has an effect on the value of the contract and the option. The
values of the contract and the option corresponding to different values of purchase
prices are shown in Table 6.4. We assume that other parameters take their base
case values.
p1 p2 V0 V100 V100 − V0 Q1 Q2
12 12 416.68 482.3 65.62 45 20
11 11 492.37 533.69 41.32 45 20
13 13 340.98 444.8 103.82 45 0
11 12 454.18 519.8 65.62 45 20
12 11 454.87 496.19 41.32 45 20
13 12 379.18 444.8 65.62 45 20
12 13 378.48 482.3 103.82 45 0
Table 6.4: Decision variables in case 3
The first row of Table 6.4 states the situation in the base case. It shows that
if the buyer gives firm orders for both periods at unit purchase prices of 12, the
buyer orders 45 units for period 1 and 20 units for period 2. In addition, the
value of the option and the contract, respectively, are 65.62 and 482.3.
We first decrease the purchase price of period 1 to 11 while keeping the pur-
chase price of period 2 constant and observe that the value of the contract is
increased to 519.8. The reason behind this is that it becomes cheaper to give
firm orders for period 1. On the other hand, the value of the option does not
change. This is due to the fact that even though it becomes cheaper to give firm
orders for period 1, it is still more expensive than exercising an option unless
p1 + h1 < e1. The reason is that there is a holding cost that needs to be paid
for one unit of firm order delivered in period 1 and carried to next period. If,
however, p1+h1 < e1 the value of the option decreases as purchase price of period
1 decreases. This is due to the fact that the buyer then neither gives firm orders
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for period 2 nor uses options, instead he places more firm orders in period 1 and
carries to the next period. The buyer prefers to meet the demand in period 2 by
firm orders of period 1 to exercise options in period 1 since it is cheaper to pur-
chase quantities in period 1 and carry to the second period. On the other hand, if
the purchase price in period 1 where the buyer cannot have any additional units
by the use of options as additional units are delivered at the beginning of the
next period is increased to 13 while the purchase price in period 2 is unchanged,
it becomes more expensive to place firm orders for period 1. Therefore, the buyer
accepts to pay less for the contract. The value of the contract decreases to 444.8.
However, the value of the option does not change. This is so because as the cost
of placing firm order for period 1 increases while it is unchanged for period 2 the
buyer will place fewer firm order for period 1 and more firm order for period 2.
The shortage of period 1 will be covered by the additional firm order of period
2. That is, the need for options does not change. Thus, the value of the option
remains the same.
To summarize, the value of the contract and the option with changes in the
purchase price of period 1 while the second period purchase price is constant is
shown in the figure below.
Figure 6.4: Contract and Option Values vs Purchase Price of Period 1
Next, the purchase price in period 2 is decreased to 11 while the purchase
price in period 1 is unchanged. Since it becomes cheaper to purchase firm orders
for period 2, the buyer accepts to pay more for the contract. The value of the
contract increases to 496.19. However, the value of the option decreases. The
reason behind this is that, it becomes cheaper to give firm orders for period 2.
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This means that the cost of placing firm orders for period 2 becomes relatively less
expensive than exercising options. Therefore, the value of the option decreases
to 41.32. On the other hand, if the purchase price in period 2 is increased to 13
while the purchase price for period 1 is kept constant, the buyer does not give any
firm orders for period 2. The buyer neither wants to pay the additional cost of
purchasing firm order in period 2, nor wants to place more firm orders for period
1 and pay the cost of carrying them to the period 2. Instead, the buyer exercises
more options to meet the demand in period 2 and this increases the value of the
option to 103.82. The value of the contract, however, does not change. This
happens, since flexibility of the buyer is enough to meet the demand of period 2
by using options. This allows the buyer not to place any firm order for period 2
at higher unit price.
To summarize, the value of the contract and the option with changes in the
purchase price of period 2 while the second period purchase price is constant is
shown in the figure below.
Figure 6.5: Contract and Option Values vs Purchase Price of Period 2
Case 4 : Effect of Demand Volatility
The buyer receives the finished products from the supplier and sells them
to customers at the end market. Therefore, the demand of the customers for
the finished products plays an important role on the value of the option. To
observe its effect we diversify the demand volatility while keeping the mean of
the demands same in all the periods.
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(D1 +D2) /2 = (D3 +D4 +D5 +D6) /4
The values of options corresponding to different demand volatilities are sum-
marized in Table 6.5. The values of the other parameters are taken as in the base
case.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 Q1 Q2 m1 m2 V0 V100 V100 − V0
45 25 55 30 40 15 45 20 35 416.68 482.3 65.62
40 30 55 30 40 15 40 55 30 421.26 468.13 46.87
50 20 55 30 40 15 50 10 45 412.07 496.47 84.4
45 25 50 35 40 15 45 50 20 409.8 466.05 56.25
45 25 60 25 40 15 45 20 40 423.55 498.55 75
Table 6.5: Decision variables in case 4
The first row of Table 6.5 states the situation in the base case. It shows that
if demand follows the pattern represented above, the value of the option is 65.62.
Furthermore, the buyer places ,respectively, 45 and 20 units firm orders for period
1 and 2 and exercises 35 options in node 1.
We first observe that decreasing the volatility of demand decreases the value
of the option. This is due to the fact that a decrease in demand volatility allows
the buyer to make more correct decisions. This implies that the uncertainty in
the market has decreased. Therefore, options become less valuable.
Next, we observe that increasing the volatility of demand increases the value
of the option. This happens, since more volatile demand leads to more mismatch
between the supply of the buyer and the demand. Therefore, options are used to
correct mismatches of period 1 and to minimize the possible mismatch of period
2 by adjusting orders to the observed demands. This, therefore, makes the option
more valuable.
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Case 5 : Volatility of Stock Prices
The buyer borrows money to acquire the contract by making short sales of
stocks. Then, he pays the debt by generating cash flows in the real market and
making self-financing portfolio transactions in the financial market. Furthermore,
we make the assumption that the demand forecast for the item is perfectly corre-
lated with the price of an underlying asset. As stock is the underlying asset which
is traded, the stock price has an effect on the value of the option. To analyze
its effect we vary the volatility of the stock prices while keeping the mean of the
stock prices constant in all the periods:
Z0 = (Z1 + Z2) /2 = (Z3 + Z4 + Z5 + Z6) /4
The value of the option corresponding to different values of stock prices are
summarized in Table 6.6. We assume that other parameters take their base case
values.
Z0 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 θ0 θ1 θ2 V0 V100 V100 − V0
15 20 10 25 5 22 8 -62.754 -26.875 -38.393 416.68 482.3 65.62
15 19 11 25 5 22 8 -70.285 -26.875 -38.393 464.91 505.93 41.02
15 20 10 28 2 24 6 -55.970 -20.673 -29.861 389.22 454.84 65.62
15 21 9 28 2 24 6 -50.853 -20.673 -29.861 356.19 438.22 82.03
15 19 11 28 2 24 6 -63.646 -20.673 -29.861 436.84 477.86 41.02
Table 6.6: Decision variables in case 5
The first row of Table 6.6 states the situation in the base case. It shows that
if the stock prices follow the pattern presented above, at the beginning of the
horizon the buyer makes 62.754 short sales of stocks. The portfolio of stocks in
node 1 and node 2, respectively, are −26.875 and −38.393. This implies that the
buyer has paid the part of his debt and has 26.875 and 38.393 remaining stocks
to pay in node 1 and node 2 respectively. In addition, it is pointed out that the
value of the option is 65.62.
Initially, we keep the stock prices in period 2 constant and analyze the effect
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of stock prices in period 1. We first observe that as volatility of the stock prices
in period 1 decreases the value of the option also decreases. This is so because
we assume that demand is perfectly correlated with the price of a risky security
and in period 1 where the decision to exercise options or not is made the prices
of stock are less volatile.
Next, we investigate the case where the stock prices in period 1 are unchanged.
We observe that the stock prices in period 2 do not have any impact on the value
of the option. This is due to the fact that in period 2, that is, at the terminal
position, there is no action taken by the buyer to exercise options or not, and
in period 1 where the decision of whether to exercise options or not is made the
prices of stocks are unaltered. However, the stock prices in period 2 impacts the
portfolio of stock in period 1. This is explained below in more detail.
Observation 2 The stock prices in period 2 do not impact the value of the option,
whereas they impact the portfolio of stock in period 1.
This is due to the fact that to repay the debt the buyer needs to cover all his
short sales, and the buyer forms his portfolio in period 1 by taking into account
the cost of unit stock in the next period, that is, the pattern that stock prices
follow in period 2.
Case 6 : Effect of Interest Rate on the Riskless Asset
At the beginning of the horizon, after paying for the contract the buyer buys
bonds and uses them later to repay the debt. Thus, the price of the riskless asset
affects the value of the option. To observe its effect we change the interest rate
on the riskless asset. The value of the option corresponding to different interest
rates are summarized in Table 6.7. The values of the other parameters are taken
as in the base case.
The first row of Table 6.7 states the situation in the base case. It shows that
if the interest rate on the riskless asset is 20%, the value of the option is 65.62.
Furthermore, the buyer places 45 and 20 units firm orders for period 1 and 2
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interest rate(%) Q1 Q2 m1 m2 V0 V100 V100 − V0
20 45 20 35 416.68 482.3 65.62
10 45 55 20 286.66 458.66 172
0 25 75 40 111.2 452.45 341.25
25 45 20 35 469.22 497.22 28
Table 6.7: Decision variables in case 6
respectively. In addition, it is pointed out that in node 1 the buyer exercises 35
options.
We observe from Table 6.7 that as the interest rate on the riskless asset de-
creases, the buyer places fewer firm orders and uses more options to meet the
demand. The reason behind this is that as the interest rate on the riskless as-
set decreases, in case of higher than expected demand to meet the demand the
buyer can make more short sales of bonds and exercise options with the money
borrowed. This, therefore, increases the value of the option.
Thus far all the cases are analyzed in a two-period model. However the anal-
ysis of the remaining parameters requires a higher dimensional model. Thus, we
will extend our model to a three-period model, and consider the binomial tree
shown in Figure 6.6.
As can be seen from Figure 6.6
N0 = {0}, N1 = {1, 2}, N2 = {3, 4, 5, 6}
N3 = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14}
a (1) = a (2) = 0
a (3) = a (4) = 1, a (5) = a (6) = 2
a (7) = a (8) = 3, a (9) = a (10) = 4
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Figure 6.6: Three-Period Binomial Tree
a (11) = a (12) = 5, a (13) = a (14) = 6
Zn = (Z
0
n, Z
1
n) n = 0, . . . , 14
where Z0n denotes the price of the riskless asset, and Z
1
n denotes the price of the
risky security.
Before moving on to the illustrations, as in the two-period case we need to
choose a base case to start analysis.
As in the two-period model, in the base case the stock prices are chosen in
such a way that the average values of them are the same in all the periods.
Z0 =
2∑
i=1
Zi/2 =
6∑
i=3
Zi/4 =
14∑
i=7
Zi/8
Similar to stock prices, demand values are chosen in a way that the average
values of them are the same in all the periods.
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2∑
i=1
Di/2 =
6∑
i=3
Di/4 =
14∑
i=7
Di/8
Taking the above specifications into account, the values of the parameters and
the corresponding decision variables in the base case are shown in Table 6.8.
Parameters Decision Var. n Z0n Z
1
n Dn θ
0
n θ
1
n Fn
0 10 15 10.44 -60.223
rt = 20 Q1 = 40 1 11 20 45 -71.663 -29.702 -292.5
pt = 12 V0 = 353.70 2 11 10 25 -23.363 -23.300 -2.5
ht = 1.5 VM = 799.10 3 12.1 25 55 23.479 -53.750 550
st = 2.5 m1 = 60 4 12.1 5 30 -4.132 -80.625 562.5
M = 100 m3 = 65 5 12.1 22 40 31.528 -76.786 -512.5
et = 10 m4 = 10 6 12.1 8 15 28.174 -107.500 -50
m5 = 75 7 13.31 30 65 1300
m6 = 35 8 13.31 20 40 762.5
9 13.31 8 35 700
10 13.31 4 20 377.5
11 13.31 25 50 1500
12 13.31 18 25 962.5
13 13.31 10 35 700
14 13.31 5 10 162.5
Table 6.8: Parameters and the decision variables in base case
Now, we will investigate the value of the option and the contract with changes
in the value of the parameters.
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Case 7 : Effect of Sales Price
The buyer sells the finished products at the end market to the customers at
unit sales prices of r1, r2 and r3 in period 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Therefore, the
values of the sales prices impact the value of the contract and the option. The
values of the contract and the option corresponding to the different values of sales
prices are summarized in Table 6.8. The values of the other parameters are taken
as in the base case.
r1 r2 r3 V0 V100 V100 − V0 Q1
20 20 20 353.7 799.1 445.4 40
20 19 18 250.45 694.31 443.86 45
18 20 20 286.59 749.8 463.21 25
20 21 22 456.94 910.51 453.57 25
22 20 20 422.79 867.66 444.87 45
Table 6.9: Decision variables in case 7
The first row of Table 6.9 states the situation in the base case. It shows that
if sales price is 20 in all periods, the buyer purchases 40 units of firm orders for
period 1. In addition, the value of the contract and the option, respectively, are
799.1 and 445.4.
If the revenue of selling unit product in period 2 and 3 is decreased, respec-
tively, to 19 and 18, the value of the contract decreases to 694.31. This is due to
the fact that the profit of selling unit product has decreased. This implies that
the contract becomes less profitable for the buyer. In addition, the value of the
option decreases to 443.86. The reason behind this is that options that are used
to meet demands generate fewer cash flows.
When the sales price of period 1 is decreased to 18 while sales prices of other
periods are unchanged, the value of the contract decreases to 749.8. The reason
behind this is that the buyer will gain less for the unit he sells in period 1.
Furthermore, since the sales price in period 1 is less than sales prices of other
periods, the buyer will prefer to sell the finished products in periods 2 and 3.
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Thus, he will give less firm orders for period 1 and meet the demand of period
1 in later periods. Therefore, the buyer will exercise more options to cover the
shortage of period 1. Intuitively, this will result in an increase in the value of the
option.
To observe changes in the value of the contract and the option in case of in-
creases in sales prices, we first increase sales prices in period 2 and 3, respectively,
to 21 and 22 while keeping the sales price in period 1 constant. Then since the
revenue of selling unit product in periods 2 and 3 is increased, the value of the
contract is also increased. This is due to the fact that increase in sales price of
periods 2 and 3 makes the contract more profitable. This, however, decreases
the firm orders for period 1. The buyer prefers to meet the demand of period 1
in later periods so that he can generate more profit. Therefore, he will exercise
more options to cover the shortage of period 1. This implies that the need for
options is increased. So, the value of the option increases.
Finally, the sales price of period 1 is increased to 22 while the sales prices of
other periods are constant. As sale of unit product in period 1 generates more
profit, the buyer accepts to pay more for the contract. The value of the contract
increases to 867.66. However, the value of the option decreases to 444.87. The
reason behind this is that, sale of unit product in period 1 becomes more profitable
than other periods and the buyer will prefer to sell whole demand of period 1 in
period 1. Therefore he will purchase more firm orders for period 1. This implies
that, there will not be any shortage but possibly some positive inventory carried
to the next periods. Therefore, the buyer will need fewer options to exercise.
The value of the contract and the option with changes in the sales prices are
summarized in the figures below.
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 51
Figure 6.7: Contract and Option Values vs Sales Price of Period 1
Figure 6.8: Contract and Option Values vs Sales Price of Period 2− 3
Case 8 : Effect of Holding Cost
The buyer purchases firm orders Qt to be delivered in period t, t = 1, . . . , T .
In some periods the buyer may give firm orders more than the demand forecast
as purchase price of that period is cheaper or the demand realized may be less
than what is expected. In such situations, the buyer carries inventory to the next
period and pays the cost of holding it. Therefore, the value of the holding cost has
an effect on the value of the contract and the option. The values of the contract
and the option corresponding to different values of holding costs are shown in
Table 6.10. The values of the other parameters are taken as in the base case.
The first row in Table 6.10 states the situation in the base case. It shows
that if the cost of carrying positive inventory for all the periods is 1.5, the buyer
purchases 40 units of firm orders for period 1. In addition, the value of the
contract and the option, respectively, are 799.1 and 445.4.
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h1 h2 h3 V0 V100 V100 − V0 Q1
1.5 1.5 1.5 353.7 799.1 445.4 40
2 2 2 326.54 793.36 466.82 25
1 1 1 380.85 805.66 424.81 45
1.5 2 2 329.73 795.75 466.02 40
2 1.5 1.5 350.52 796.71 446.19 25
1.5 1 1 377.67 802.48 424.81 40
0.5 1.5 1.5 360.06 804.93 444.87 45
Table 6.10: Decision variables in case 8
We first observe that increasing the holding cost of periods 2 and 3 to 2 while
keeping the first period holding cost constant decreases the value of the contract
to 795.75. This is so because the loss of the buyer caused by carrying inventory
in periods 2 and 3 are increased. This implies that the contract becomes less
profitable. The value of the option, however, increases to 466.02. This is due
to the fact that the cost of carrying unit inventory becomes more expensive and
the buyer prefers to exercise options when needed instead of purchasing more
firm orders and paying higher inventory costs by carrying inventories. Whereas,
if holding cost of periods 2 and 3 are decreased to 1 while the holding cost of
period 1 is constant, the value of the contract increases to 802.48. The reason
is that the cost of carrying unit inventory has decreased. Hence, the contract
becomes more profitable. However, the value of the option decreases to 424.81.
The reason behind this is that as cost of carrying inventory becomes cheaper the
buyer will prefer to give more firm orders and carry inventory to exercise more
options.
Next, we keep holding costs of periods 2 and 3 constant and observe the impact
of first period holding cost. We first increase the holding cost of period 1 to 2.
Since the cost of carrying inventory becomes more expensive, the expenses of
the buyer in case of having positive inventory are increased. Hence, the contract
becomes less profitable for the buyer. Therefore he accepts to pay less for the
contract. The value of the contract decreases to 796.71. However, the value of
the option increases to 446.19. This is due to the fact that the cost of carrying
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inventory in period 1 has increased and therefore the buyer purchases fewer firm
orders for period 1. This implies that the need of options in later periods to cover
shortage of period 1 is increased. Finally, decreasing the first period holding cost
to 0.5 increases the value of the contract to 804.93. This is due to the fact that the
expense of the buyer caused by carrying unit inventory is decreased. Therefore,
the contract becomes more profitable for the buyer. However, the value of the
option decreases to 444.87. The reason is that a decrease in the value of the
holding cost of period 1 triggers the buyer to purchase more firm orders in case
of larger demands. Hence, instead of using more options the buyer prefers to
purchase more firm orders and carry them to the later periods.
The value of the contract and the option with changes in the holding costs
are summarized in the figures below.
Figure 6.9: Contract and Option Values vs Holding Cost of Period 1
Figure 6.10: Contract and Option Values vs Holding Cost of Period 2− 3
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 54
Case 9 : Effect of Stock-out Cost
In the model it is assumed that the demand of the customers are uncertain.
In addition, stock-out in all the periods except the last period is allowed. Hence,
the value of the contract and the option are independent of the value of the stock-
out cost of the last period, whereas they are dependent of the stock-out costs of
the other periods. The values of the contract and the option corresponding to
different values of stock-out costs are summarized in Table 6.11. The values of
the other parameters are taken as in the base case.
s1 s2 s3 V0 V100 V100 − V0 Q1
2.5 2.5 2.5 353.7 799.1 445.4 40
2 2.5 2.5 353.7 801.16 447.46 25
3 2.5 2.5 353.7 798.56 444.86 45
2.5 2 2.5 353.7 799.87 446.17 40
2.5 5 2.5 353.7 795.47 441.77 45
Table 6.11: Decision variables in case 9
The first row of Table 6.11 states the situation in the base case. It shows that
if the holding cost in all the periods are 2.5, the buyer accepts to pay 799.1 for
the contract. In addition, the value of the option is 445.4.
We observe that an increase in the stock-out cost of period 1 and/or 2 results
in a decrease in the value of the contract. This is due to the fact that having
stock-out becomes more expensive. This implies that the contract becomes less
profitable in case of shortages in period 1 and/or 2. In addition, since the buyer
does not want to have shortages he gives more firm orders for period 1. This
implies that in period 2 the buyer needs fewer options since he will not have any
backorder to cover. Furthermore, he may have some positive inventory. There-
fore, the need of options is decreased. Thus, the value of the option decreases.
Whereas, decreasing the stock-out cost in period 1 and/or 2 increases the value of
the contract. The reason behind this is that the loss of the buyer in case of having
shortages is decreased. This means that the contract becomes more profitable.
Therefore, the buyer accepts to pay more for the contract. However, the change
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in the value of the option is opposite. Since unit cost of not meeting the demand
is decreased, the buyer undertakes the risk of having shortages and purchases
less firm orders for period 1. This implies that in later periods the buyer needs
more options to cover the shortages of period 1. Thus, the value of the option
increases.
The value of the contract and the option with changes in stock-out costs are
summarized in the figures below.
Figure 6.11: Contract and Option Values vs Stock-out Cost of Period 1
Figure 6.12: Contract and Option Values vs Stock-out Cost of Period 2
Chapter 7
Demand Partially Correlated
with the Price of a Risky Security
Until now we made all the analysis under the assumption that the demand forecast
for the item is perfectly correlated with the price of an underlying security. In this
chapter, however, we relax this assumption and analyze our model in presence
of partial correlation of demand with the price of a risky security traded in the
financial markets. Furthermore, we assume that demand and risky asset price
processes evolve as binomial trees.
7.1 Scenario Tree
In Chapter 4, we showed that financial and demand market trees coincide under
the assumption of perfect correlation of demand of the item with the price of a
risky security. However, once we relax this assumption we will come up with a
different tree structure. We explain the new tree structure below in more details.
As represented in Figure 4.2 perfect correlation assumption implies one-to-one
correspondence between demand of node n, Dn, and price of a risky security at
node n, Zn. On the other hand, partial correlation assumption may result in two
56
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different scenarios. First one is that two different demands may correspond to a
unique risky security price at node n as can be seen from Figure 7.1. This means
that there exists two different demand processes corresponding to a unique risky
asset price process. In Figure 7.1 D1n and D2n, respectively, represent the values
of the first and the second demand processes at node n. The other probability as
represented in Figure 7.2 is that two different risky security prices may correspond
to a unique demand at node n. This implies that there exists two different risky
asset price processes corresponding to a unique demand process. In Figure 7.2
Z1n and Z2n, respectively, represent the values of the first and the second risky
asset price processes at node n.
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Figure 7.1: Scenario Tree in Presence of Two Demand Processes
Figure 7.2: Scenario Tree in Presence of Two Risky Asset Price Processes
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One can reorganize the above figures and obtain a simpler form to navigate
through the arcs. Without loss of generality we reorganize Figure 7.1 by a two-
period example. In the example we assume there is one risky security and one
riskless asset whose prices are denoted below the nodes. In addition, values of the
two different demand processes corresponding to each node are denoted above the
nodes, where the uppermost ones represent the values of the first demand process
and the other ones represent the values of the second demand process. This
implies that, for example in node 1 when the price of the risky security is 20,
demand value will be either 40 or 45. Moreover, if from node 1 node 3 is reached,
the price of the risky security will be 25, and the demand value will be 50 or 55.
In the previous chapters, however, this was not possible. That is, if the price of
the risky security changes from 20 to 25 it was certain that the demand value
will change from, say, 45 to 55 as there is a perfect correlation.
Figure 7.3: Example of a Scenario Tree in Presence of Two Demand Processes
In order to simplify the above figure, from each node we will obtain two
different nodes whose prices of the risky securities are the same but the demand
values are different. That is, there will be two different numbered nodes with
the same risky security prices but different demands. Therefore, each node n
for n ∈ N2 will be reached by a node following the same demand process with
itself and by another node following the other demand process. In Figure 7.4
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the numbers at the right of each node denotes the demand and the price of
the riskless and risky assets. The nodes which are obtained by those following
the same demand process are denoted by solid arrows, and those following the
other demand process are denoted by dashed arrows. This procedure can also
be applied to the case where there is a unique demand value corresponding to a
node but different risky security prices.
Figure 7.4: Two-Period Financial and Demand Market Scenario Tree
We make the following observations from the figure above.
Observation 3 Each node n for n ∈ Nt, t = 2, . . . , T has two parent nodes,
while there exists a unique parent node for each node n ∈ N1.
The parent node of each node n for n ∈ N1 is unique since at the initial period
there exists a unique node which gives rise to all nodes of the first period. On the
other hand, there exists two parent nodes for each node n, n ∈ Nt, t = 2, . . . , T
since each node can be achieved by a node following the same demand process
with itself and by another node following the other demand process.
Observation 4 Each node n for n ∈ Nt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1 has four child nodes.
Except the initial period, at all the periods each node gives rise to two child nodes
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that follows the same demand process with itself and two child nodes that follows
the other demand process.
We will denote the set of child nodes of node n for n ∈ Nt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1
that follows the same demand process with itself by C1 (n) ⊂ Nt+1. On the other
hand, we will represent the set of child nodes of node n for n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T−1
that follows the other demand process by C2 (n) ⊂ Nt+1.
Before moving on to the mathematical formulation, we explain the notation
numerically by using Figure 7.4.
As explained in Observation 4, in the first period each node has a unique
parent node.
a (1) = a (2) = a (3) = a (4) = {0}.
However, in other periods each node has two parent nodes; one with the same
demand process with itself and one with the other demand process.
a (5) = a (6) = a (7) = a (8) = {1, 2},
a (9) = a (10) = a (11) = a (12) = {3, 4}.
As explained in Observation 5, four nodes emanate from the initial period
all following the same demand process with node 0 since at the beginning of the
horizon both process are the same. Therefore,
C1 (0) = {1, 2, 3, 4} C2 (0) = ∅
However, in other periods each node gives rise to two nodes with the same
demand process with itself and two nodes with the other demand process.
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C1 (1) = {5, 6} C2 (1) = {7, 8}
C1 (2) = {7, 8} C2 (2) = {5, 6}
C1 (3) = {9, 10} C2 (3) = {11, 12}
C1 (4) = {11, 12} C2 (4) = {9, 10}
7.2 Mathematical Formulation
In this section, we will reformulate our model according to the new tree structure.
However, since the tree structure has changed, the adjustments explained below
need to be done.
Each node n in period 1 can be achieved by a single path. However, as can
be seen from Figure 7.4 each node n in period 2 can be obtained by two different
paths. For example, node 5 can be achieved by the following paths.
0→ 1→ 5
0→ 2→ 5
Furthermore, each node n in period 3 can be obtained by four different paths.
The reason behind this is that there exists two different paths for each node
n ∈ N2 and each node in period 3 is achieved by two different nodes in period 2.
This can also be observed from Figure 7.5.
For example, node 13 can be achieved by the following paths.
0→ 1→ 5→ 13
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Figure 7.5: Three-Period Financial and Demand Market Scenario Tree
0→ 2→ 5→ 13
0→ 1→ 7→ 13
0→ 2→ 7→ 13
We can generalize the number of paths that the node n ∈ Nt for t = 1, . . . , T
can be obtained as follows.
Claim 1 There exists 2t−1 different paths for each node n ∈ Nt for t = 1, . . . , T .
Proof : By induction on t:
t = 1: Each node n ∈ N1 can only be achieved by node 0. Therefore, there exists
unique path ∀n ∈ N1 as satisfied by 2t−1 = 21−1 = 20 = 1.
t = 2: Each node n ∈ N2 can be achieved by two different nodes in period 1 as
illustrated in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. Therefore, there exists two paths ∀n ∈ N2 as
satisfied by 2t−1 = 22−1 = 21 = 2.
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Now assume there exists 2(T−1)−1 = 2T−2 paths for each node n ∈ NT−1.
Since each node n ∈ NT−1 can be obtained by 2T−2 paths, and each node n ∈ NT
can be obtained by two different nodes in period T−1 there exists 2T−2∗2 = 2T−1
paths ∀n ∈ NT . 
All the decisions at node n are made according to the path the node n is
obtained. Hence, for each path the node n is achieved, there must exist different
decision variables for each decision. We handle this situation by giving indices to
decision variables of node n. The decision variable at node n will be indexed by
ni if node n is obtained by path i. The paths will be numbered according to the
following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 The path numbering algorithm
Step 0: Write all the paths that the node n can be obtained.
Step 1: Starting from the last node of the path, which is node n, look at the
previous nodes of each path, pick the one that follows the same process with
node n and start indexing with this path. If ∃ more than one node following
the same process with node n go to step 2.
Step 2: Starting from the last nodes of the paths, look at the previous nodes
of the paths until there is no tie. Then start indexing with the paths including
the nodes that follow the same process with the node that the last tie occurs.
Step 3: Starting with the number that has not been given as an index yet,
apply step 2 to the remaining paths.
In order to make it more clear, I will show how the paths are numbered so
that the decision variables corresponding to that node are indexed by examples
based on the Figures 7.4 and 7.5.
Without loss of generality, I will consider the paths ending with node 5 and
node 7 in Figure 7.4.
0→ 1→ 5 (1)
0→ 2→ 5 (2)
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0→ 2→ 7 (1)
0→ 1→ 7 (2)
As can be seen above, there are two paths ending with node 5. Therefore,
starting from the last node of the paths, which is node 5, we will look at the
previous nodes of each path. We see that node 1 and node 2 are the only nodes
giving rise to node 5. Hence, we will number the path including node 1 as the
first path and the other path as the second path, since nodes 1 and 5 follow the
same process. Furthermore, the decision variables at node 5 will be indexed by
5i if node 5 is achieved by path i where i = 1, 2. The numbering of the paths
ending with node 7 and the indexing of the decision variables at node 7 are done
similarly.
Now, without loss of generality, I will consider the paths ending with node 13
in Figure 7.5.
0→ 1→ 5→ 13 (1)
0→ 2→ 5→ 13 (2)
0→ 2→ 7→ 13 (3)
0→ 1→ 7→ 13 (4)
As can be seen above there are four paths ending with node 13. Therefore,
starting from the last node of the paths, which is node 13, we will look at the
previous nodes of each path. We see that node 5 and node 7 are the nodes giving
rise to node 13. Hence, we will start indexing with the paths including node 5
as nodes 5 and 13 follow the same process. Since there are two paths including
node 5, we will look at the nodes preceding the node 5 in the paths. We observe
that node 5 is obtained by nodes 1 and 2 in the paths. Therefore, we will index
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the path including node 1 as the first path and the path including node 2 as
the second path. Next, we will apply the same algorithm for the paths including
node 7. Similar to node 5, node 7 is obtained by nodes 1 and 2 in the paths.
Therefore, starting from the smallest number that has not been given as index
yet, we will index the paths including node 2 first and the path including node
1 next. Furthermore, the decision variables at node 13 will be indexed by 13i if
node 13 is achieved by path i where i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Note that we number the path 0 → 2 → 7 as path 1 and index the decision
variables at node 7 as 71. Moreover, we number the path 0 → 2 → 7 → 13 as
path 3 and the decision variables at node 13 as 133. We will index the decision
variables at the parent node of node 13 in path 3 as 73. However, in two period
when the same path is followed, the decision variables at node 7 are indexed
by 71. The reason behind this is that there are 2
3−1 = 22 = 4 paths in period
3 and 22−1 = 21 = 2 paths in period 2. Hence, whenever node n, n ∈ Nt is
achieved by path i where i > 2(t−1)−1 = 2t−2 the indices of the decision variables
of the parent node of node n must be equated to those of t− 1 period case. For
example, θa(13)3 = θ73 = θ71 . Therefore, since there are 2
t−2 paths in period t− 1,
assuming parent node of node n, a (n), for n ∈ Nt, is node α where α ∈ Nt−1,
the relationship between the decision variables of the parent node of node n are
given below.
θa(n)i = θαi−2t−2 ma(n)i = mαi−2t−2 Ia(n)i = Iαi−2t−2
I−a(n)i = I
−
α i−2t−2 I
+
a(n)i
= I+αi−2t−2
Finally, we will denote the changes in the portfolio, i.e., θni − θa(n)i by ∆θni .
With the above adjustments our model that we refer to as (P2) can be for-
mulated as follows.
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maxV
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 + V = 0 (7.1)
Zn ·∆θni = r1
(
Dn − I−ni
)− (p1Q1 + e1mni + h1I+ni + s1I−ni) ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.2)
Zn ·∆θni = rt
(
Dn − I−ni + I−a(n)i
)
− (ptQt + etmni + htI+ni + stI−ni) ∀n ∈ Nt, i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
t = 2, . . . , T − 1
(7.3)
Zn ·∆θni = rT
(
Dn + I
−
a(n)i
)
− (pTQT + hT Ini) ∀n ∈ NT , i = 1, . . . , 2T−1
(7.4)
Zn · θni ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT , i = 1, . . . , 2T−1
(7.5)
Ini = Q1 −Dn ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.6)
Ini = Ia(n)i +Qt +ma(n)i −Dn ∀n ∈ Nt, i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
t = 2, . . . , T
(7.7)
Ini = I
+
ni
− I−ni ∀n ∈ Nt, i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(7.8)
Ini ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT , i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
(7.9)
mni ≤M ∀n ∈ Nt, i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(7.10)
Qt ≥ 0 t = 1, . . . , T
(7.11)
I+ni ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ Nt, i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(7.12)
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I−ni ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ Nt, i = 1, . . . , 2t−1
t = 1, . . . , T − 1
(7.13)
The difference of the above model from the former (given in Chapter 4) one
is that, we do not have unique paths for nodes. Therefore, we introduce indices
to the decision variables of each node to denote by which path it is achieved.
However, the corresponding constraints are the same as in Chapter 4, but this
time repeated for each path.
7.3 Duality
This section considers the problem discussed in section 7.1 and 7.2 through its
dual. As it is not possible to write the constraints of the dual in a compact form
for higher dimensional periods, this section will only be considered for two period.
Hence, before moving on to the duality analysis I will rewrite the primal problem
for two period and refer to it as (P3).
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maxV
s.t.
Z0 · θ0 + V = 0 (7.14)
Zn ·∆θni = r1
(
Dn − I−ni
)− (p1Q1 + e1mni + h1I+ni + s1I−ni) ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.15)
Zn ·∆θni = r2
(
Dn + I
−
a(n)i
)
− (p2Q2 + h2Ini) ∀n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2
(7.16)
Zn · θni ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2
(7.17)
Ini = Q1 −Dn ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.18)
Ini = Ia(n)i +Q2 +ma(n)i −Dn ∀n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2
(7.19)
Ini = I
+
ni
− I−ni ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.20)
Ini ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2
(7.21)
mni ≤M ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.22)
Qt ≥ 0 t = 1, 2 (7.23)
I+ni ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.24)
I−ni ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N1, i = 1
(7.25)
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As in Chapter 5, we begin forming the dual problem to (P3) by attaching
dual variables qn for all the nodes of the financial constraints (7.14) and (7.15),
variables qni for all the nodes of the constraints (7.16), and wni with the set of
constraints (7.17).
Then we obtain the following financial constraints in the dual corresponding
to decision variables V , θ0, θni for n ∈ N1, i = 1 and n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2 respectively.
q0 = 1 (7.26)
q0Z0 =
∑
m∈C1(0)
qmZm (7.27)
qnZn =
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
qmiZm n ∈ N1 (7.28)
qni ≥ 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2 (7.29)
Next, we analyze the constraints in the dual arising from the constraints of the
real market. We assign dual variables yn and yni for all the nodes of the inventory
balance constraints (7.18) and (7.19) respectively. In addition, variables kn and
fn are assigned with the set of constraints (7.20) and (7.22) respectively. Then
the following dual constraints are obtained.
∑
n∈N1
p1qn + yn ≥ 0 (7.30)
2∑
i=1
∑
n∈N2
p2qni + yni ≥ 0 (7.31)
e1qn + fn +
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ 0 (7.32)
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h1qn − yn +
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ 0 n ∈ N1 (7.33)
(r1 + s1) qn − r2
 2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
qmi
+ yn − 2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ 0 n ∈ N1 (7.34)
h2qni − yni ≥ 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2 (7.35)
Finally, the objective function of the dual problem is obtained by multiplica-
tion of the terms that contains only the parameters of the problem (P3) with the
respective dual variables.
Therefore, the dual program that we refer to as (D2) is formulated as follows.
min
∑
n∈N1
Dn (r1qn + yn) +
∑
n∈N2
2∑
i=1
Dn (r2qni + yni) +M
∑
n∈N1
fn
s.t.
(7.26)− (7.35)
fn ≥ 0 n ∈ N1
Again by the basic theorem of linear programming an optimal solution for
(P3) exists if and only if it exists for the dual (D2) too, and that their optimal
values are equal. Furthermore, an optimal solution for (P3) exists if and only if it
is feasible and bounded. Moreover, (P3) is bounded if and only if there exists at
least one probability measure Q under which the price process {Zt} is martingale,
and there exists yn and fn satisfying (7.30) - (7.35).
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Now, assume that the financial market is arbitrage-free.
Theorem 4 The maximum value that the buyer will accept to pay for the con-
tract is
min
Q∈M
{∑
n∈N1
Dn (r1qn + y
∗
n) +
∑
n∈N2
2∑
i=1
Dn
(
r2qni + y
∗
ni
)
+M
∑
n∈N1
f ∗n
}
where y∗ and f ∗ are the optimal solution of the linear program
min
∑
n∈N1
Dnyn +
∑
n∈N2
2∑
i=1
Dnyni +M
∑
n∈N1
fn
s.t.∑
n∈N1
yn ≥ −
∑
n∈N1
p1qn (7.36)
2∑
i=1
∑
n∈N2
yni ≥ −
2∑
i=1
∑
n∈N2
p2qni (7.37)
fn +
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ −e1qn n ∈ N1 (7.38)
yn −
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≤ h1qn n ∈ N1 (7.39)
yn −
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ r2
 2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
qmi
− (r1 + s1) qn n ∈ N1 (7.40)
yni ≤ h2qni n ∈ N2 (7.41)
fn ≥ 0 n ∈ N1 (7.42)
By taking the value of T = 2 in Observation 1 of Chapter 5, we can make the
same observation from the above theorem. That is, if f ∗n = 0, an increase in the
value of M does not have any effect on the value of the contract. Furthermore,
by reorganizing the constraints of the above program under the assumptions of
Chapter 5 , we obtain an equation similar to one obtained in Chapter 5.
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∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci (n)
ymi ≥ max
{
−
∑
n∈N1
(p1 + h1) qn,−
∑
n∈N1
e1qn
}
. (7.43)
Hence, by taking the value of t = 1 in Observation 2 and 3 of Chapter 5,
we can also make the same observations from the above theorem. That is, if
p1 + h1 ≤ e1 decreasing the purchase price of period 1, while the purchase price
of period 2 is unchanged increases the value of the contract and if e1 ≤ p1 + h1
decreasing the exercise price of period 1 increases the value of the contract.
Finally, we make the following observation about the contract value in pres-
ence of the partial correlation of the demand of the item with the risky security
price.
Proposition 4 The value of the contract in the case of partially correlated de-
mands and risky security prices is less than or equal to that of perfectly correlated
demands and risky security prices.
Proof : By taking the value of the partially correlated demands and risky security
prices suitably, it is possible to make them correlate perfectly. This implies that
all the feasible solutions of (D1) is also satisfied by (D2). This moreover implies
that optimal solution of (D1) is a feasible solution for (D2). Hence, the optimal
value of (D2) is less than or equal to that of (D1). 
The effects of the other parameters on the value of the contract and the
option cannot be derived from the theorem above since the relative positions
of the parameters become important. Hence, we will illustrate how the other
parameters affect the value of the contract and the option in the next section by
taking the relative positions of the parameters into account.
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7.4 Experimental Study
In this section, in order to observe how relaxing the perfect correlation assumption
affects the role of the parameters on the value of the contract and the option, we
will perform numerical studies. As in Chapter 6, we will begin the analysis with
a two-period model and consider the binomial tree shown in Figure 7.6. A higher
dimensional model will be considered when need arises. For all the analysis it is
assumed that there is one risky security and one riskless asset.
Figure 7.6: Two-Period Financial and Demand Market Scenario Tree
As can be seen from Figure 7.6
N0 = {0}, N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
N2 = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
a (1) = a (2) = a (3) = a (4) = {0}
a (5) = a (6) = a (7) = a (8) = {1, 2}
CHAPTER 7. PARTIALLY COR. DEMAND & RISKY ASSET PRICE 75
a (9) = a (10) = a (11) = a (12) = {3, 4}
Zn = (Z
0
n, Z
1
n) n = 0, . . . , 14
where Z0n denotes the price of the riskless asset, and Z
1
n denotes the price of the
risky security.
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, there are two possible scenarios
in presence of the partial correlation assumption. We will call the one that two
different demands may correspond to a unique risky security price at node n as
scenario 1 and the other scenario that two different risky security prices may
correspond to a unique demand at node n as scenario 2. For each scenario, we
need to choose a base case to perform the experiments.
In both scenarios, the stock prices and demand values will be chosen in such
a way that the average price and average demand value remain constant at all
periods in order to observe the effect of volatility of stock price and demand.
Z0 =
4∑
i=1
Zi/4 =
12∑
i=5
Zi/8
4∑
i=1
Di/4 =
12∑
i=5
Di/8
With the above specifications, the values of the parameters and the corre-
sponding decision variables in the base case in scenario 1 and 2 are represented
respectively in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.
CHAPTER 7. PARTIALLY COR. DEMAND & RISKY ASSET PRICE 76
Parameters Decision Var. n Z0n Z
1
n Dn θ
0
n θ
1
n
rt = 20 Q1 = 40 0 10 15 41.561 -53.671
pt = 12 Q2 = 30 1 12 20 45 -4.667 -25.559
ht = 1.5 V0 = 295.7 2 12 20 40 2.734 -26.875
st = 2.5 VM = 389.45 3 14.4 10 30 39.163 -45.293
M = 100 4 14.4 10 25 28.621 -38.393
e = 10 5 14.4 25 55 5.353
6 14.4 5 30 21.5
7 14.4 25 50
8 14.4 5 25
9 14.4 22 45
10 14.4 8 20
11 14.4 22 40
12 14.4 8 15
Table 7.1: Parameters and decision variables in base case in scenario 1
Now, we analyze the value of the option and the contract by varying the value
of the parameters and list the main results without repeating all the details that
are similar to the previous chapter.
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Parameters Decision Var. n Z0n Z
1
n Dn θ
0
n θ
1
n
rt = 20 Q1 = 45 0 10 15 37.128 -50.726
pt = 12 Q2 = 0 1 12 20 45 -32.741 -18.205
ht = 1.5 V0 = 261.92 2 12 23 45 -30.948 -23.370
st = 2.5 VM = 388.12 3 14.4 7 25 6.985 -37.524
M = 100 4 14.4 10 25 0.434 -33.594
e = 10 5 14.4 25 55 6.936
6 14.4 5 30
7 14.4 28 55
8 14.4 2 30
9 14.4 24 40
10 14.4 6 15
11 14.4 22 40
12 14.4 8 15
Table 7.2: Parameters and decision variables in base case in scenario 2
Case 1 : Effect of Buyer Flexibility
To study the effect of flexibility available to a buyer we vary the value of M .
We observe that in both scenarios the values of the contract and the option are
unaffected as long as the buyer is flexible enough to exercise the amount used in
the base case. On the other hand, it is observed that decreasing the value of M
to an amount lower than the amount of options exercised in the base case results
in a decrease in both the values of the contract and the option.
Figure 7.7: Contract and Option Values vs M in Scenario 1
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Figure 7.8: Contract and Option Values vs M in Scenario 2
Case 2 : Effect of Exercise Price
We test the effect of exercise price by changing the unit price paid to exercise
an option. In both scenarios, we observe that as long as options are used to
satisfy the demand, as exercise price decreases the values of the contract and the
option increases.
Figure 7.9: Contract and Option Values vs Exercise Price in Scenario 1
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Figure 7.10: Contract and Option Values vs Exercise Price in Scenario 2
Case 3 : Effect of Purchase Price
We observe that in both scenarios as the unit cost of placing a firm order
for period 1 is decreased, while keeping it constant for period 2, the value of
the contract increases, whereas the value of the option decreases if and only if
p1 + h1 < e1.
Figure 7.11: Contract and Option Values vs p1 in Scenario 1
Again, in both scenarios decreasing the purchase price of period 2 while keep-
ing it constant for period 1, increases the value of the contract as long as p2 < p1,
whereas decreases the value of the option at all times.
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Figure 7.12: Contract and Option Values vs p1 in Scenario 2
Figure 7.13: Contract and Option Values vs p2 in Scenario 1
Figure 7.14: Contract and Option Values vs p2 in Scenario 2
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Case 4 : Effect of Demand Volatility
The effect of demand volatility is studied by varying the values of the demand
processes and the results are summarized in Table 7.3 and 7.4 for scenario 1 and
2 respectively. The values of the other parameters are taken as in the base case.
In both scenarios, we observe that increasing the volatility of demand results in
an increase in the value of the option.
n Dn Dn Dn Dn Dn
1 45 40 50 45 45
2 40 40 40 40 40
3 30 30 30 30 30
4 25 30 20 25 25
5 55 55 55 50 60
6 30 30 30 35 25
7 50 50 50 50 50
8 25 25 25 25 25
9 45 45 45 45 45
10 20 20 20 20 20
11 40 40 40 40 40
12 15 15 15 15 15
V100 − V0 93.75 37.5 150 84.37 103.12
Table 7.3: Parameters and decision variables in case 4 in scenario 1
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n Dn Dn Dn Dn Dn
1 45 40 50 45 45
2 45 40 50 45 45
3 25 30 20 25 25
4 25 30 20 25 25
5 55 55 55 50 60
6 30 30 30 35 25
7 55 55 55 50 60
8 30 30 30 35 25
9 40 40 40 40 40
10 15 15 15 15 15
11 40 40 40 40 40
12 15 15 15 15 15
V100 − V0 126.2 90.14 162.26 108.17 144.23
Table 7.4: Parameters and decision variables in case 4 in scenario 2
Case 5 : Volatility of Stock Prices
The effect of volatility of stock prices is tested by changing the values of the
risky security price processes and the results are summarized in Tables 7.5 and
7.6 for scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. The values of the other parameters are
taken as in the base case.
In both scenarios we first keep the stock prices in period 2 constant and observe
that the value of the option decreases as volatility of the stock prices in period 1
decreases. The reason behind this is that even it is not perfect we assume that
there is a correlation between demand and the price of a risky security and in
period 1 where the decision to exercise options or not is given the prices of stock
are less volatile.
Next, we keep the stock prices in period 1 constant and observe that the value
of the option is unaffected from the stock prices of period 2. This is so because
in period 2 there is no action taken by the buyer to exercise options or not, and
in period 1 where the decision of whether to exercise options or not is given the
prices of stocks are unaltered. However, the stock prices in period 2 impact the
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n Zn Zn Zn Zn Zn
0 15 15 15 15 15
1 20 19 20 21 19
2 20 19 20 21 19
3 10 11 10 9 11
4 10 11 10 9 11
5 25 25 28 28 28
6 5 5 2 2 2
7 25 25 28 28 28
8 5 5 2 2 2
9 22 22 24 24 24
10 8 8 6 6 6
11 22 22 24 24 24
12 8 8 6 6 6
V100 − V0 93.75 76.17 93.75 105.47 76.17
Table 7.5: Parameters and decision variables in case 5 in scenario 1
portfolio of stocks in period 1 since the buyer needs to cover all his short sales
to repay the debt, and forms his portfolio in period 1 by taking into account the
price of the stock in the next period.
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n Zn Zn Zn Zn Zn
0 15 15 15 15 15
1 20 19 20 21 19
2 23 23 23 23 23
3 7 7 7 7 7
4 10 11 10 9 11
5 25 25 28 28 28
6 5 5 2 2 2
7 28 28 28 28 28
8 2 2 2 2 2
9 24 24 24 24 24
10 6 6 6 6 6
11 22 22 24 24 24
12 8 8 6 6 6
V100 − V0 126.2 136.72 126.2 117.19 136.72
Table 7.6: Parameters and decision variables in case 5 in scenario 2
Case 6 : Effect of Interest Rate on the Riskless Asset
The effect of interest rate on the riskless asset is analyzed simply by observing
the value of the option for different interest rates. The results are summarized
in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 for scenario 1 and 2 respectively. The values of the other
parameters are taken as in the base case.
interest rate(%) V100 − V0
0 343.75
10 191.64
20 93.75
25 63.2
Table 7.7: Parameters and decision variables in case 6 in scenario 1
In both scenarios, we observe that as the interest rate on the riskless asset
decreases the value of the option increases. This is due to the fact that lower
interest rate allows the buyer to make more short sales of bonds and exercise
options with the money borrowed to meet larger than expected demand.
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interest rate(%) V100 − V0
0 396.92
10 236.98
20 126.2
25 28
Table 7.8: Parameters and decision variables in case 6 in scenario 2
For the analysis of the remaining parameters we will extend our model to a
three-period model and consider the binomial tree shown in the figure below.
Figure 7.15: Three-Period Financial and Demand Market Scenario Tree
As can be seen from Figure 7.11
N0 = {0}, N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
N2 = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, N3 = {13, 14, . . . , 27, 28}
a (1) = a (2) = a (3) = a (4) = {0}
a (5) = a (6) = a (7) = a (8) = {1, 2}
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a (9) = a (10) = a (11) = a (12) = {3, 4}
a (13) = a (14) = a (17) = a (18) = {5, 7}
a (15) = a (16) = a (19) = a (20) = {6, 8}
a (21) = a (22) = a (25) = a (26) = {9, 11}
a (23) = a (24) = a (27) = a (28) = {10, 12}
Zn = (Z
0
n, Z
1
n) n = 0, . . . , 28
where Z0n denotes the price of the riskless asset, and Z
1
n denotes the price of the
risky security.
Before moving on to the illustrations, as in the two-period model we need to
choose a base case for each scenario to start analysis. By the similar reasoning of
two-period case in both scenarios the stock prices and the demand values will be
chosen in such a way that the average of them are constant at all periods. The
values of the parameters and the corresponding decision variables in the base case
for scenario 1 and 2 are given in appendix. We will now illustrate the roles of the
remaining parameters on the values of the contract and the option.
Case 7 : Effect of Sales Price
By varying the sales prices and keeping the values of the other parameters
constant, we observe that in both scenarios the value of the contract increases as
the unit revenue of selling finished products increases. Furthermore, we observe
that the value of the option decreases by an increase in sales price of period 1
unless the buyer places as many firm order as in period 1 to meet the demand
of period 1 in order not to miss the opportunity of generating higher profits. On
the other hand, we observe that the value of the option increases by an increase
in sales price of periods 2 and 3 as long as the buyer places fewer firm orders
for period 1 and exercises more options to meet the demand of period 1 in later
periods to generate higher revenues.
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Figure 7.16: Contract and Option Values vs r1 in Scenario 1
Figure 7.17: Contract and Option Values vs r1 in Scenario 2
Figure 7.18: Contract and Option Values vs r2 − r3 in Scenario 1
CHAPTER 7. PARTIALLY COR. DEMAND & RISKY ASSET PRICE 88
Figure 7.19: Contract and Option Values vs r2 − r3 in Scenario 2
Case 8 : Effect of Holding Cost
We test the effect of holding cost on the values of the contract and the option
by changing the unit cost of holding a positive inventory. We first observe that as
long as the buyer holds inventories, the contract becomes more profitable and the
buyer accepts to pay more for the contract as the unit cost of holding a positive
inventory decreases. On the other hand, we observe that the value of the option
decreases as the unit cost of holding a positive inventory decreases.
As can be seen from Figure 7.21, in scenario 2 the value of the contract is
unaffected by the changes in h1. The reason is that, due to the choice of the
values of the parameters in scenario 2, the buyer does not hold inventories in any
node of period 1. Therefore, we consider another setting and change the values
of Z12 to 19 and Z
1
3 to 11 and call this scenario as scenario 2
1. We then observe
the value of the contract by changing the cost of holding inventory in period 1.
As expected, we observe that the result that is shown in Figure 7.22 is similar to
that of previous chapter and that of scenario 1 in this chapter.
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Figure 7.20: Contract and Option Values vs h1 in Scenario 1
Figure 7.21: Contract and Option Values vs h1 in Scenario 2
Figure 7.22: Contract and Option Values vs h1 in Scenario 2
1
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Figure 7.23: Contract and Option Values vs h2 − h3 in Scenario 1
Figure 7.24: Contract and Option Values vs h2 − h3 in Scenario 2
Case 9 : Effect of Stock-out Cost
The impact of the stock-out cost is tested by varying the unit cost of having
shortages. As expected, it is observed that as long as there is a backorder, the
values of the contract decreases as the unit penalty cost in period 1 increases, since
the buyer will generate fewer profits in case of shortages in period 1. Moreover,
it is observed the value of the option also decreases by an increase in the penalty
cost of period 1, since the buyer will place more firm orders for period 1 in order
not to pay the higher stock-out cost and hence necessitates fewer options in later
periods.
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Figure 7.25: Contract and Option Values vs s1 in Scenario 1
Figure 7.26: Contract and Option Values vs s1 in Scenario 2
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis, we considered a general single buyer - single supplier quantity
flexibility contract with options for multiple periods. We investigate the problem
of the buyer of the contract and find the maximum acceptable price of the contract
for the buyer by analyzing both financial and real markets. In our study, we
assume that the markets evolve as discrete scenario trees. The essence of the
thesis is that it incorporates financial and real markets in this setting. The
details of this approach are discussed throughout the thesis.
Firstly, a model to find the maximum acceptable price of the contract for the
buyer is presented under the assumption of the perfect correlation between the
demand of the item and the price of the risky asset traded in the financial markets.
Then, we make use of duality theory to analyze the problem. From duality
considerations, we make some inferences through observations of the effects of the
position of the parameters on the value of the contract. One of the observation
that we have made is that, increasing the flexibility available to a buyer increases
the value of the contract up to a level, but when the buyer has the desired
flexibility, the value of the contract is unaffected from an increase in the value of
M .
Next, we assume that the unit cost of placing a firm order is the same at all
periods and the buyer is flexible enough to use as much as options he wants and
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show that; (i) decreasing the purchasing price in a period decreases the value of
the contract as long as the cost of exercising an option is more expensive than
the cost of placing a firm order plus the cost of holding a positive inventory (ii)
decreasing the cost of exercising an option decreases the value of the contract
as long as the cost of placing a firm order plus the cost of holding a positive
inventory is more expensive than the cost of exercising an option.
We then relax the assumption of perfect correlation and extend our model
to the case of partial correlation between the demand and the price of the risky
security traded in the financial market. We further assume that both markets
evolve as binomial trees and show that our model works under this assumption
and check the validity of the observations derived under the perfect correlation
assumption.
Under both of the assumptions, we perform experimental studies to see the
effects of the parameters on the value of the contract and the cost of the flexibility
available to the buyer. Under both assumptions, we observe mainly; (i) as the
volatility of the demand increases the value of the option increases (ii) the value
of the option increases by an increase in the volatility of the price of the risky
security traded in the financial market in period 1, whereas it is unaffected by
that of period 2 (iii) as the interest on the riskless asset increases the value of the
option decreases. We further observe the behavior of the value of the contract and
the option by changing other operational costs, which are mainly; (iv) an increase
in sales price of period 1 increases the value of the contract, whereas it decreases
the value of the option (v) an increase in sales prices of other periods increases
both the values of the contract and the option (vi) the values of the contract and
the option decrease as the cost of holding positive inventory increases (vii) as the
cost of having backorder increases, both the values of the contract and the option
decrease. The details and the conditions on the validities of these observations are
mentioned through the thesis without repeating all the details for the extended
model when similar results are obtained.
There is room for improvement and future research of the model under con-
sideration in the case of partial correlation of the demand and the price of the
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risky security. For instance, the assumption that both financial and real markets
evolve as binomial trees can be relaxed.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Equations
A.1 Derivation of Equation 7.43
Summing the constraints 7.38 ∀n ∈ N1 we have
∑
n∈N1
fn +
∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ −
∑
n∈N1
e1qn.
Furthermore by the assumption
∑
n∈N1 fn = 0. Therefore, one obtains
∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ −
∑
n∈N1
e1qn. (A.1)
Similar to constraint 7.38, summing the constraints 7.39 ∀n ∈ N1 we have
∑
n∈N1
yn −
∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≤
∑
n∈N1
h1qn.
Reorganizing the above constraint one can obtain
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∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥
∑
n∈N1
yn −
∑
n∈N1
h1qn. (A.2)
In addition, constraint 7.36 can be rewritten as
0 ≥ −
∑
n∈N1
yn −
∑
n∈N1
p1qn. (A.3)
Summing the constraints A.2 and A.3 we obtain
∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ −
∑
n∈N1
(p1 + h1) qn. (A.4)
Finally, constraints A.1 and A.4 imply that
∑
n∈N1
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ max
{
−
∑
n∈N1
(p1 + h1) qn,−
∑
n∈N1
e1qn
}
. (A.5)
A.2 Derivation of Dual Constraints of Chp. 7
The dual constraint corresponding to the decision variable V , that is the value of
the contract, is
q0 = 1. (A.6)
Next, the dual constraint corresponding to θn, n ∈ N0 is the martingale
condition
q0Z0 =
∑
m∈C1(0)
qmZm, (A.7)
APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS 99
and the dual constraint corresponding to θni , n ∈ N1 is
qnZn =
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
qmiZm n ∈ N1. (A.8)
The dual constraint corresponding to the decision variables θni for n ∈ N2,
i = 1, 2 is
(qni + wni)Zn = 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2,
and since the first component Z0n = 1 for all states n we have
qni + wni = 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2.
In addition, by the non-negativity of the portfolio in the terminal positions
wni ≤ 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2.
Combining the above two constraints one has the following constraint in the
dual.
qni ≥ 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2. (A.9)
The dual constraint corresponding to the firm orders Qt is
∑
n∈N1
p1qn + yn ≥ 0, (A.10)
2∑
i=1
∑
n∈N2
p2qni + yni ≥ 0. (A.11)
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The constraint in the dual arising from the number of options exercised, i.e.
mni , n ∈ N1 is
e1qn + fn +
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ 0. (A.12)
The dual constraint corresponding to the net inventory at state n, n ∈ N1 is
−yn +
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi + kn = 0 n ∈ N1.
Reformulating the above constraint one obtains
kn = yn −
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi n ∈ N1.
The constraint in the dual arising from the positive inventory at state n,
n ∈ N1 is
h1qn − kn ≥ 0 n ∈ N1,
and the constraint in the dual arising from the negative inventory at state n,
n ∈ N1 is
(r1 + s1) qn − r2
 2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
qmi
+ kn ≥ 0 n ∈ N1.
Replacing kn by yn −
∑2
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n) ymi n ∈ N1 one has the following con-
straints in the dual corresponding to, respectively, positive and negative inventory
at state n, n ∈ N1.
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h1qn − yn +
2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ 0 n ∈ N1, (A.13)
(r1 + s1) qn − r2
 2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
qmi
+ yn − 2∑
i=1
∑
m∈Ci(n)
ymi ≥ 0 n ∈ N1 (A.14)
Finally, the dual constraint corresponding to the net inventory at the terminal
positions which is also the positive inventory since shortages are not allowed in
the last period is
h2qni − yni ≥ 0 n ∈ N2, i = 1, 2. (A.15)
A.3 Base Case Values in Scenario 1 and 2
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Parameters Decision Var. n Z0n Z
1
n Dn
0 10 15
rt = 20 Q1 = 40 1 11 20 45
pt = 12 V0 = 191.06 2 11 20 40
ht = 1.5 VM = 669.81 3 11 10 30
st = 2.5 4 11 10 25
M = 100 5 12.1 25 55
e = 10 6 12.1 5 30
7 12.1 25 50
8 12.1 5 25
9 12.1 22 45
10 12.1 8 20
11 12.1 22 40
12 12.1 8 15
13 13.31 30 65
14 13.31 20 40
15 13.31 8 35
16 13.31 4 20
17 13.31 30 60
18 13.31 20 35
19 13.31 8 30
20 13.31 4 15
21 13.31 25 55
22 13.31 18 30
23 13.31 10 40
24 13.31 5 15
25 13.31 25 50
26 13.31 18 25
27 13.31 10 35
28 13.31 5 10
Table A.1: Parameters and decision variables in base case in scenario 1
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Parameters Decision Var. n Z0n Z
1
n Dn
0 10 15
rt = 20 Q1 = 25 1 11 20 45
pt = 12 V0 = 127.14 2 11 23 45
ht = 1.5 VM = 632.75 3 11 7 25
st = 2.5 4 11 10 25
M = 100 5 12.1 25 55
e = 10 6 12.1 5 30
7 12.1 28 55
8 12.1 2 30
9 12.1 24 40
10 12.1 6 15
11 12.1 22 40
12 12.1 8 15
13 13.31 30 65
14 13.31 20 40
15 13.31 8 35
16 13.31 4 20
17 13.31 32 65
18 13.31 24 40
19 13.31 5 35
20 13.31 1 20
21 13.31 28 50
22 13.31 19 25
23 13.31 9 35
24 13.31 2 10
25 13.31 25 50
26 13.31 18 25
27 13.31 10 35
28 13.31 5 10
Table A.2: Parameters and decision variables in base case in scenario 2
